Scott analyzes whether whole-body screening MRIs are worth it by doing a detailed cost-benefit calculation, finding they cost about $108,000 per quality-adjusted life-year saved (right around the threshold of cost-effectiveness), and argues that while rich people immune to anxiety might benefit, most people claiming to be rational about medical decisions probably aren't. Longer summary

Scott performs a detailed cost-benefit analysis of whole-body screening MRIs in response to controversy over medical experts recommending against them. Using rough order-of-magnitude estimates, he calculates that screening 1,000 people saves about 32 quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) at a cost of $2.7 million plus time and anxiety costs, working out to about $108,000 per QALY saved—right at the threshold of cost-effectiveness. He explores whether rich people who don't care about money should get screened, finding a plausible case but with many caveats about unknown factors that could swing the calculation either way. He then applies this analysis to Midjourney's proposed ultrasound scanner, finding it's unlikely to be clearly better than MRI. The post ends with a warning that people who think they're rational enough to ignore false positives are often the same people making irrational medical decisions based on contrarian appeals. Shorter summary

Scott explores moral offsetting, introducing a framework distinguishing axiology, morality, and law to argue that we can offset axiological but not moral violations. Longer summary

This post explores the concept of moral offsetting, comparing it to carbon offsetting and questioning its limitations. Scott introduces a framework distinguishing between axiology (study of what's good), morality (study of right actions), and law (legal rules). He argues that these concepts make different compromises between goodness, implementation, and coordination. Using this framework, Scott proposes that we can offset axiology but not morality. For example, carbon emissions or meat consumption can be offset as they don't violate moral laws, while murder cannot be offset as it does. The post concludes that this framework provides a clearer answer to the moral offsetting problem than previous attempts, though acknowledging it's somewhat speculative. Shorter summary