Scott Alexander rebuts Bryan Caplan's arguments about mental illness, criticizing the preference/constraint dichotomy and providing counterarguments to Caplan's claims. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Bryan Caplan's latest arguments about mental illness, criticizing Caplan's preference/constraint dichotomy and his claim that mental illnesses are just voluntary preferences. Scott argues that the distinction between preferences and constraints is not clear-cut, and that both physical and mental illnesses involve a mix of the two. He provides several counterarguments, including examples from physical illnesses, gradients of ability, and cases where the 'gun to the head' test fails. Scott also discusses how the framing of conditions as preferences or constraints depends on factors like ease of satisfaction and social norms. He concludes by rejecting Caplan's argument that one must either deny mental illness exists or classify homosexuality as a mental illness. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that public outrage over specific misdeeds is not arbitrary, but a strategic way to enforce important social norms with limited resources. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Bryan Caplan's article about the arbitrariness of public outrage, proposing a different theory. He argues that people get upset over violations of established norms because it's an efficient way to use limited enforcement resources. Scott uses examples of police prioritizing certain crimes and the international response to chemical weapons to illustrate his point. He extends this reasoning to explain public outrage over sexual harassment and suggests that enforcing taboos against clearly defined bad behaviors can be more effective than trying to prevent all forms of misconduct. The post concludes by applying this logic to the case of China's treatment of Uighurs, arguing that strongly enforcing the norm against putting minorities in concentration camps can have broader preventative effects. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander distinguishes between 'universal culture' and 'Western culture', exploring how the former outcompetes all traditional cultures and the ethical implications of this process. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the concept of 'universal culture' as distinct from 'Western culture', arguing that what is often called 'Westernization' is actually the spread of a culture optimized for industrial societies. He explains how this universal culture outcompetes traditional cultures, including Western culture itself, and explores the ethical implications of this process. The post concludes by considering whether we should support or resist the spread of universal culture, acknowledging the complexity of the issue without reaching a definitive stance. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques Bryan Caplan's argument that psychiatric diseases are unusual preferences rather than real illnesses, providing counterarguments and evidence to show this view is untenable. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques Bryan Caplan's 2006 paper arguing that psychiatric diseases are better understood as unusual preferences rather than true illnesses. Scott challenges Caplan's distinction between preferences and budgetary constraints, arguing it breaks down for complex human experiences. He provides counterexamples showing how mental illnesses can resemble physical constraints, discusses how most psychiatric patients seek help voluntarily, and examines issues with Caplan's explanations of alcoholism and schizophrenia. Scott concludes that viewing psychiatric illnesses as simply different preferences is not tenable given the evidence. Shorter summary