Scott Alexander rebuts Bryan Caplan's arguments about mental illness, criticizing the preference/constraint dichotomy and providing counterarguments to Caplan's claims. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Bryan Caplan's latest arguments about mental illness, criticizing Caplan's preference/constraint dichotomy and his claim that mental illnesses are just voluntary preferences. Scott argues that the distinction between preferences and constraints is not clear-cut, and that both physical and mental illnesses involve a mix of the two. He provides several counterarguments, including examples from physical illnesses, gradients of ability, and cases where the 'gun to the head' test fails. Scott also discusses how the framing of conditions as preferences or constraints depends on factors like ease of satisfaction and social norms. He concludes by rejecting Caplan's argument that one must either deny mental illness exists or classify homosexuality as a mental illness. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques Bryan Caplan's argument that psychiatric diseases are unusual preferences rather than real illnesses, providing counterarguments and evidence to show this view is untenable. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques Bryan Caplan's 2006 paper arguing that psychiatric diseases are better understood as unusual preferences rather than true illnesses. Scott challenges Caplan's distinction between preferences and budgetary constraints, arguing it breaks down for complex human experiences. He provides counterexamples showing how mental illnesses can resemble physical constraints, discusses how most psychiatric patients seek help voluntarily, and examines issues with Caplan's explanations of alcoholism and schizophrenia. Scott concludes that viewing psychiatric illnesses as simply different preferences is not tenable given the evidence. Shorter summary