Scott Alexander analyzes EA's approach to criticism, arguing that specific, targeted critiques are more valuable than vague, paradigmatic ones for driving real change. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the phenomenon of Effective Altruism's (EA) seemingly excessive openness to criticism. He argues that while EA appears to welcome criticism, much of it is paradigmatic and vague, leading to little actionable change. He contrasts this with specific, targeted criticisms that actually challenge individuals and practices, which he believes are more likely to lead to real improvements. Scott uses examples from psychiatry and EA to illustrate his point, suggesting that embracing vague criticisms can lead to inefficiency and a move away from precise, effective practices. He concludes by discussing the nature of paradigm shifts, arguing that they arise from specific anomalies rather than broad, ideological critiques. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents highlights from reader comments on his review of Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', offering various perspectives and clarifications on Kuhn's ideas about scientific progress. Longer summary

This post highlights comments on Scott Alexander's review of Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'. The comments provide additional context, clarifications, and perspectives on Kuhn's work. They discuss topics such as the nature of paradigm shifts, the relationship between different scientific theories, Kuhn's metaphysics, and the implications of his ideas for the philosophy of science. The post also includes an analogy comparing scientific progress to building skyscrapers, and touches on the debate between Kuhn and Popper's views on falsification in science. Shorter summary

Scott reviews Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions', finding its thesis on paradigm shifts in science intriguing but frustratingly vague, especially beyond physics. Longer summary

Scott reviews Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', which argues that science progresses through paradigm shifts rather than simple accumulation of facts. Kuhn posits that scientific paradigms are comprehensive worldviews that guide research and interpretation of data. When anomalies accumulate, a new paradigm may emerge to replace the old one. Scott finds Kuhn's thesis intriguing but frustratingly vague in parts, especially in applying it beyond physics. He draws connections between Kuhn's ideas and predictive coding in neuroscience, suggesting both describe how pre-existing mental structures shape perception and understanding. Overall, Scott sees value in Kuhn's perspective but wishes for more clarity and examples from other scientific fields. Shorter summary