Scott Alexander argues that even seemingly extreme media misinformation usually involves misleading presentation of true facts rather than outright fabrication, examining several reader-provided counterexamples. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to criticisms of his previous post about media rarely lying by examining several examples readers provided. He argues that even in extreme cases like Alex Jones' Sandy Hook conspiracy theories or claims about election fraud, media sources are typically highlighting true but misleading facts rather than outright fabricating information. Scott contends this matters because it means efforts to censor 'misinformation' will always require subjective judgment calls rather than being a straightforward process of removing falsehoods. He suggests people want to believe bad actors are doing something fundamentally different than good faith reasoning, but in reality most are just reasoning poorly under uncertainty. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores expert and reader comments on his post about motivated reasoning and reinforcement learning, discussing brain function, threat detection, and the implementation of complex behaviors. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses comments on his post about motivated reasoning and reinforcement learning. The post covers expert opinions on brain function and reinforcement learning, arguments about long-term rewards of threat detection, discussions on practical reasons for motivated reasoning, and miscellaneous thoughts on the topic. Key points include debates on how the brain processes information, the role of Bayesian reasoning, and the challenges of implementing complex behaviors through genetic encoding. Scott also reflects on his own experiences and the limitations of reinforcement learning models in explaining human behavior. Shorter summary

Scott analyzes motivated reasoning as misapplied reinforcement learning, explaining how it might arise from the brain's mixture of reinforceable and non-reinforceable architectures. Longer summary

Scott explores the concept of motivated reasoning as misapplied reinforcement learning in the brain. He contrasts behavioral brain regions that benefit from hedonic reinforcement learning with epistemic regions where such learning would be detrimental. The post discusses how this distinction might explain phenomena like 'ugh fields' and motivated reasoning, especially in novel situations like taxes or politics where brain networks might be placed on a mix of reinforceable and non-reinforceable architectures. Scott suggests this model could explain why people often confuse what is true with what they want to be true. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques the use of bias arguments in debates, explaining why they're often counterproductive and suggesting more constructive ways to address bias. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the problems with using bias arguments in debates. He argues that these arguments are often unproductive because everyone is biased, people are hypersensitive to biases against their side, it's hard to define bias, and bias arguments don't lead anywhere productive. He suggests that bias arguments can be useful when they provide new information, can be quantified, offer unbiased alternatives, or in private conversations between trusted friends. Scott emphasizes that first-person bias arguments (recognizing one's own biases) are the most valuable, as they allow for honest self-reflection and improvement. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines how debates often revolve around vague concepts with positive or negative associations rather than specific claims, leading to logical fallacies and tribal thinking. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'ethnic tension' in arguments, showing how debates often center around vague concepts loaded with good or bad karma rather than specific factual or moral claims. He argues this leads to motte-and-bailey fallacies, tribal affiliations, and motivated reasoning. The post analyzes how concepts become associated with groups, creating proxy ethnicities and making rational debate difficult. Scott suggests precision and separating concepts as a potential solution to this problem. Shorter summary