Scott Alexander dissects and criticizes a common argument against AI safety that compares it to past unfulfilled disaster predictions, finding it logically flawed and difficult to steelman. Longer summary

Scott Alexander analyzes a common argument against AI safety concerns, which compares them to past unfulfilled predictions of disaster (like a 'coffeepocalypse'). He finds this argument logically flawed and explores possible explanations for why people make it. Scott considers whether it's an attempt at an existence proof, a way to trigger heuristics, or a misunderstanding of how evidence works. He concludes that he still doesn't fully understand the mindset behind such arguments and invites readers to point out if he ever makes similar logical mistakes. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores the misconception of utilitarianism, arguing that many common political actions are more ethically questionable than his own 'utilitarian' views. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the perception of utilitarianism and how it's often misunderstood. He argues that many common political actions, which violate ethical rules for a supposed greater good, are not seen as utilitarian. Meanwhile, his own views labeled as 'utilitarian' are often less extreme. He suggests this disparity stems from people's discomfort with applying calculations to morality, rather than from the actual ethical implications of different actions. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes that political hyperpartisanship might be a form of trauma, comparing PTSD symptoms to behaviors observed in political extremists. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the idea that political extremism might be a form of trauma. He compares symptoms of PTSD to behaviors observed in politically hyperpartisan individuals, such as triggers, distorted cognitions, and hypervigilance. The post discusses how trapped priors in the brain might explain both cognitive and emotional aspects of political extremism. Scott also considers the implications of framing political partisanship as trauma, including potential risks of expanding the concept of trauma. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues against significantly updating beliefs based on single dramatic events, advocating for consistent policies based on pre-existing probability distributions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander argues against dramatically updating one's beliefs based on single events, even if they are significant. He contends that a good Bayesian should have distributions for various events and only make small updates when they occur. The post covers several examples, including COVID-19 origin theories, 9/11, mass shootings, sexual harassment scandals, and crises in the effective altruism movement. Scott suggests that while dramatic events can be useful for coordination and activism, they shouldn't significantly alter our understanding of underlying probabilities. He advocates for predicting distributions beforehand and maintaining consistent policies rather than overreacting to individual incidents. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques a study claiming an illusion of moral decline, pointing out methodological flaws and suggesting alternative explanations for the perception of declining morality. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques a study by Mastroianni and Gilbert (MG) that claims there is an illusion of moral decline. The study argues that while people consistently believe morality is declining, objective measures show it has remained stable. Scott identifies several issues with the study's methodology and interpretation, including problems with timescale, accuracy, measurement, and sensitivity of the data used. He suggests that the perception of moral decline might be due to each generation judging the present by the moral standards of their youth, rather than a cognitive bias. Scott also points out that the study fails to consider many important aspects of morality in its analysis. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends his thorough analysis of ivermectin studies, arguing that dismissing controversial topics without addressing evidence can inadvertently promote conspiracy theories. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to criticism from Chris Kavanagh about his lengthy analysis of ivermectin studies. He argues that dismissing controversial topics without addressing evidence can push people toward conspiracy theories. Scott shares his personal experience with Atlantis conspiracy theories as a teenager, emphasizing the importance of providing rational explanations rather than mockery. He critiques Kavanagh's apparent stance against examining evidence, likening it to religious fideism. Scott defends the value of practicing critical thinking and evidence evaluation, even on settled issues, to build skills for harder cases. He argues that conspiracy theorists use similar reasoning processes to everyone else, just with more biases, and that understanding these processes is crucial for effective communication and prevention of misinformation. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines two types of conspiracy theories, suggesting they stem from different cognitive processes: unusual evidence processing and emotional priors. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores two types of conspiracy theories: those centered on anomalies in narratives (like Kennedy assassination theories) and those based more on emotional responses (like the Global Adrenochrome Pedophile Cabal). He suggests that the first type often stems from unusual evidence processing styles, while the second type may be rooted in strong emotions acting as priors for cognitive processing. Scott proposes that some conspiracy theories might be attempts to justify strong negative feelings towards certain groups or individuals, providing a clear and objectively bad reason to hate them when reality is often more complex and ambiguous. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander addresses reactions to his claim that media rarely lies, exploring different interpretations of 'lying' and examining specific cases of alleged media deception. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the reactions to his previous posts about media rarely lying, addressing various criticisms and examples provided by commenters. He explores different interpretations of 'lying', examines specific cases of alleged media deception, and reiterates his position that while media often misleads or reasons poorly, it rarely engages in outright fabrication of facts. Scott also reflects on the nature of conspiracy theories and the importance of understanding how people can genuinely believe false things. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses the dangers of relying on 'Heuristics That Almost Always Work' through various examples, highlighting their limitations and potential consequences. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'Heuristics That Almost Always Work' through various examples, such as a security guard, doctor, futurist, skeptic, interviewer, queen, and weatherman. He argues that while these heuristics are correct 99.9% of the time, they provide no real value and could be replaced by a rock with a simple message. The post highlights the dangers of relying too heavily on such heuristics, including wasted resources on experts, false confidence, and the potential for catastrophic failures when the rare exceptions occur. Scott concludes by noting that those who dismiss rationality often rely on these heuristics themselves, and emphasizes the importance of being aware of the 0.1% of cases where the heuristics fail. Shorter summary

Scott analyzes motivated reasoning as misapplied reinforcement learning, explaining how it might arise from the brain's mixture of reinforceable and non-reinforceable architectures. Longer summary

Scott explores the concept of motivated reasoning as misapplied reinforcement learning in the brain. He contrasts behavioral brain regions that benefit from hedonic reinforcement learning with epistemic regions where such learning would be detrimental. The post discusses how this distinction might explain phenomena like 'ugh fields' and motivated reasoning, especially in novel situations like taxes or politics where brain networks might be placed on a mix of reinforceable and non-reinforceable architectures. Scott suggests this model could explain why people often confuse what is true with what they want to be true. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander analyzes the evolving narrative around a news story about ivermectin overdoses in Oklahoma hospitals, illustrating how cognitive biases and media dynamics can distort information. Longer summary

Scott Alexander examines a news story about ivermectin overdoses overwhelming Oklahoma hospitals, showing how it evolved from a local news report to international coverage, and was then seemingly debunked. He uses this as a case study in cognitive biases, media narratives, and the difficulty of determining truth in polarized situations. The post is structured in three parts, each revealing a new layer of complexity and uncertainty in the story. Scott emphasizes the importance of skepticism and checking sources, even (or especially) when a story confirms one's existing beliefs. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'trapped priors' as a fundamental problem in rationality, explaining how it leads to persistent biases and suggesting potential solutions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'trapped priors' as a fundamental problem in rationality. He explains how the brain combines raw experience with context to produce perceptions, and how this process can lead to cognitive biases and phobias. The article discusses how trapped priors can make it difficult for people to update their beliefs, even in the face of contradictory evidence. Scott also examines how this concept applies to political biases and suggests potential ways to overcome trapped priors. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander introduces his new blog, Astral Codex Ten, centered around the concept of ṛta and exploring topics related to rationality, science, and human cognition. Longer summary

Scott Alexander introduces his new blog, Astral Codex Ten, explaining that it focuses on the concept of ṛta, an ancient Sanskrit word related to order, truth, and rationality. He describes the blog's main topics, including reasoning, science, psychiatry, medicine, ethics, genetics, AI, economics, and politics. Scott emphasizes the importance of understanding cognitive biases and how they influence our perceptions and judgments. He mentions his connections to the rationalist and effective altruist communities, as well as his background in psychiatry, and expresses his commitment to fostering an engaged readership. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines seven cognitive traps that lead doctors to believe they're above-average, potentially applying to other client-choice professions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores why doctors often believe they're above-average practitioners. He presents seven cognitive traps that contribute to this belief: 1) Doctors mainly see patients who left worse doctors, 2) Patient retention creates a positively biased sample, 3) Patient departures are often unnoticed, 4) Long-term patients are usually success stories, 5) Doctors are aware of others' mistakes but not their own, 6) Successes are attributed to skill while failures are attributed to circumstances, and 7) Doctors excel at metrics they personally value. Scott suggests these biases might apply to other professions where clients choose their service providers. Shorter summary

The post explores how emotional learning creates hard-to-update mental models, drawing parallels between psychotherapy, psychedelics, and rationality techniques in overcoming these 'mental mountains'. Longer summary

This post discusses the book 'Unlocking The Emotional Brain' (UtEB) and its implications for understanding biases and mental processes. The author explores how emotional learning creates unconscious predictive models that guide behavior, and how these models can be difficult to update even in the face of contradictory evidence. The post draws parallels between UtEB's approach, psychedelic therapy, and rationality techniques, suggesting that they all aim to overcome mental 'mountains' that separate different areas of knowledge or belief. The author proposes that these mental separations might be a necessary feature of how our brains generalize from experiences, but can also lead to problems like cognitive biases and psychiatric symptoms. The post concludes by considering how this framework might help understand and address deeply held but irrational beliefs. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes a hierarchy of types of disagreements, from low-level meta-debate to high-level philosophical differences, and discusses how to engage in more productive arguments. Longer summary

Scott Alexander proposes a hierarchy of types of disagreements, expanding on Paul Graham's earlier work. He categorizes disagreements from meta-debate and social shaming at the bottom, through gotchas, single facts, and single studies, up to good-faith surveys of evidence and high-level generators of disagreement at the top. The post explains each level, discusses how to recognize and handle them, and suggests that engaging in higher-level disagreements can lead to mutual respect and potentially shift deeply held beliefs over time. Scott emphasizes the rarity of high-level disagreements in public discourse and the importance of understanding this hierarchy for more productive debates. Shorter summary

Scott presents a distorted map of Europe as a riddle, challenging readers to reconsider their perceptions and solve the puzzle. Longer summary

Scott Alexander presents a distorted map of Europe and challenges readers to figure out why it appears incorrect. He suggests that the problem lies not with the map, but with the viewer's perception. The post is structured as a riddle, with Scott providing hints through links to other works. The answer to the riddle is revealed in a linked image, encouraging readers to engage in problem-solving and to consider how our perceptions can be misleading. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses the difficulty of recognizing concepts we might be missing, using examples from psychology and sociology to argue for keeping an open mind towards seemingly trivial ideas. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'concept-shaped holes' - ideas or experiences that we might be missing without realizing it. He uses personal anecdotes and examples from fields like psychology and sociology to illustrate how we might think we understand something when we actually don't, or dismiss important ideas as trivial. The post discusses three main points: the difficulty in recognizing one's own emotional or relational limitations, the challenge of truly understanding concepts like 'atomization' or 'consumerism', and the importance of keeping an open mind towards seemingly meaningless fields of study. Scott argues for erring on the side of caution when dismissing ideas that many find profound, suggesting that what seems trivial might actually be beyond our current understanding. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends rationalists against common criticisms, arguing that the movement is self-aware and actively tries to avoid past mistakes while striving for improvement. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to common criticisms of rationalists, economists, and psychiatrists. He argues that these criticisms are often outdated or based on misunderstandings, and that the fields in question are usually well aware of their own shortcomings. He focuses on the rationalist community, explaining that they actively try to avoid the mistakes of past movements, are aware of potential pitfalls, and strive for constant self-improvement and error minimization. Scott emphasizes that while the rationalist movement is likely still making mistakes, they are new ones rather than the obvious errors that critics often assume. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that true logical debate, rarely attempted, could be more effective in changing minds than commonly believed, and is necessary for long-term progress in distinguishing truth from falsehood. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques two articles arguing that facts and logic are ineffective in changing people's minds, especially regarding political issues. He contends that true debate, following specific conditions he outlines, is rarely attempted and could be more effective than assumed. He suggests that collaborative truth-seeking and adversarial collaborations could be powerful tools for the media. Alexander argues that logical debate is an asymmetric weapon favoring truth, unlike rhetoric or violence which can be used equally by all sides. He concludes that while improving debate quality is a slow process, it's necessary for long-term progress in distinguishing truth from falsehood. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines why compelling but unlikely stories on large internet platforms are probably lies, despite our reluctance to believe so. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the prevalence of seemingly incredible stories on large internet platforms like Reddit. He proposes that, given the massive user base, even a small percentage of trolls or liars can produce numerous convincing but false stories. This principle extends to viral news stories, blog posts, and even scientific research, where the most interesting or surprising results are disproportionately likely to be false. Despite understanding this logically, Scott notes that it's psychologically difficult to dismiss these stories as lies, and he explores possible reasons for this cognitive dissonance. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the ethics of sympathy for workers in difficult professions, exploring the tension between economic incentives and personal experiences in shaping our views on labor issues. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the ethics of sympathy for workers in difficult professions, comparing his support for striking junior doctors with his lesser sympathy for struggling adjunct professors. He examines the role of personal experience, economic incentives, and societal obligations in shaping our views on these issues. The post delves into the complexities of 'skin in the game' arguments, discussing whether those directly affected by a situation have unique insights or are too biased to offer objective assessments. Scott uses personal anecdotes and hypothetical scenarios to illustrate the tension between rational economic arguments and emotional realities, ultimately questioning whether personal experience provides knowledge that can't be fully reduced to factual propositions. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander shares and comments on highlights from Philip Tetlock's 'Superforecasting', discussing forecasting, cognitive biases, and organizational effectiveness. Longer summary

This post is a collection of highlights and commentary on Philip Tetlock's book 'Superforecasting'. Scott Alexander shares quotes from the book and provides his own analysis on topics such as evidence-based medicine, cognitive biases in forecasting, the importance of probabilistic thinking, and organizational effectiveness. He also reflects on the implications of these ideas for fields like intelligence analysis, politics, and rationality. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'Superforecasting' by Philip Tetlock, discussing the traits of highly accurate predictors and the book's validation of rationalist techniques. Longer summary

This post reviews Philip Tetlock's book 'Superforecasting', which explores the qualities of highly accurate predictors. Tetlock's Good Judgment Project identified a group of 'superforecasters' who consistently outperformed others, including CIA analysts. The review discusses the characteristics of these superforecasters, emphasizing their understanding of logic and probability, ability to break down problems, and resistance to cognitive biases. Scott Alexander notes the similarities between superforecasters' methods and rationalist techniques, suggesting the book's value lies in providing high-status validation for these approaches rather than presenting new information to those already familiar with rationality concepts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that creativity comes from mining external sources of 'noise' or 'disruption' rather than just thinking hard. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of creativity as a resource that needs to be mined from external sources of 'noise' or 'disruption'. He argues that creativity isn't just about thinking hard, but about finding ways to break out of our usual thought patterns. The post discusses various sources of this 'noise', including misunderstandings, cross-cultural studies, historical perspectives, and conversations with smart people who hold opposing views. Scott emphasizes the importance of seeking out these sources of disruption to expand our concept space and generate new ideas. Shorter summary