Scott Alexander argues that even seemingly extreme media misinformation usually involves misleading presentation of true facts rather than outright fabrication, examining several reader-provided counterexamples. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to criticisms of his previous post about media rarely lying by examining several examples readers provided. He argues that even in extreme cases like Alex Jones' Sandy Hook conspiracy theories or claims about election fraud, media sources are typically highlighting true but misleading facts rather than outright fabricating information. Scott contends this matters because it means efforts to censor 'misinformation' will always require subjective judgment calls rather than being a straightforward process of removing falsehoods. He suggests people want to believe bad actors are doing something fundamentally different than good faith reasoning, but in reality most are just reasoning poorly under uncertainty. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues against the claim that 'rationality free from ideology doesn't exist', asserting that recognizing irrationality implies the existence of rationality. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques the argument that 'there's no such thing as rationality free from ideology'. He argues that if we can identify people who are especially irrational or biased (like Alex Jones), then we must also be able to recognize those who are more rational or objective. Scott contends that while perfect rationality might be impossible, this doesn't mean we can't strive for improvement. He suggests that claiming the impossibility of true rationality is actually arrogant, as it implies one has reached the limits of what's possible. The post emphasizes the importance of recognizing that some approaches can be more rational than others, and that we should learn from those who are better at rationality rather than dismissing the concept entirely. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander compares two contrasting models of how social movements gain or lose respectability, using examples from gay rights and environmental issues to explore their implications. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'respectability cascades' in social movements, comparing two contrasting models. The first model, exemplified by the gay rights movement, suggests that when less respectable individuals publicly support a cause, it gradually becomes more acceptable for increasingly respectable people to join. The second model, illustrated by issues like endocrine disruptors and immigration, suggests that when disreputable people champion a cause, it becomes toxic and respectable people avoid it. Scott discusses the strategic implications of these models, particularly for his own interest in protecting scientific integrity from regressive leftism. He considers various factors that might determine which model applies in a given situation, such as the initial level of taboo, the likeability of supporters, and the availability of alternatives for supporters. Shorter summary