Scott Alexander examines Greg Lukianoff's definition of cancel culture and explores its limitations through hypothetical scenarios, arguing for a more nuanced understanding to strengthen anti-cancel-culture coalitions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses Greg Lukianoff's definition of cancel culture and explores its limitations through a series of hypothetical scenarios. He argues that while Lukianoff's definition is a good start, it doesn't address many nuanced edge cases. The post presents various examples involving pedophilia, controversial research, and media reactions to offensive content. Scott emphasizes the need for a more robust definition to strengthen anti-cancel-culture coalitions and clarify what actions are acceptable or not. He concludes that while it's difficult to define cancel culture precisely, more work on these questions could help create stronger agreements among those opposing it. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that altruism and vitalism mostly align in practice, and that focusing on their theoretical divergences often stems from signaling rather than genuine pursuit of societal improvement. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to critiques of his understanding of the Nietzschean objection to altruism, particularly the idea that vitalism (maximizing life, glory, and strength) is superior. He argues that in most normal cases, altruism and vitalism suggest the same solutions, and their apparent divergence only occurs in extreme, unrealistic scenarios. Scott suggests that both philosophies, when taken to extremes, lead to absurd outcomes. He expresses suspicion towards those who focus too much on the divergence between altruism and vitalism in normal cases, arguing that such focus often stems from a desire to signal toughness rather than genuinely pursuing societal strength. The post concludes by challenging vitalists to 'pretend to really try' in implementing their philosophy, suggesting that this would likely lead to outcomes similar to those pursued by altruists. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander summarizes and responds to comments on his review of 'What We Owe The Future', addressing debates around population ethics, longtermism, and moral philosophy. Longer summary

This post highlights key comments on Scott Alexander's review of William MacAskill's book 'What We Owe The Future'. It covers various reactions and debates around topics like the repugnant conclusion in population ethics, longtermism, moral philosophy, AI risk, and the nature of happiness and suffering. Scott responds to several comments, clarifying his views on philosophy, moral reasoning, and the challenges of population ethics. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews Will MacAskill's 'What We Owe The Future', a book arguing for longtermism and considering our moral obligations to future generations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews Will MacAskill's book 'What We Owe The Future', which argues for longtermism - the idea that we should prioritize helping future generations. The review covers the book's key arguments about moral obligations to future people, ways to affect the long-term future, and population ethics dilemmas. Scott expresses some skepticism about aspects of longtermism and population ethics, but acknowledges the book's thought-provoking ideas and practical suggestions for having positive long-term impact. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his post about criticism of EA, addressing various points about scientific paradigms, types of criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his previous post about criticism of EA. He addresses various points raised by commenters, including discussions about the nature of paradigm shifts in science, the value of specific vs. general criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Scott clarifies that he wasn't arguing EA only wants non-threatening criticism, but rather that some organizations genuinely want to improve. He also reflects on the challenges of distinguishing between expressing opinions and evangelizing, especially for philosophies that make unusual moral demands. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses reactions to his 'Justice Creep' article, exploring different perspectives on framing social issues as matters of justice. Longer summary

This post discusses various reactions to Scott's previous article on 'Justice Creep'. It covers three main categories of responses: those who support framing issues as justice matters, those who see it as a harmful trend, and a comment about 'sexual justice' for incels. Scott then explores the implications of these perspectives, particularly focusing on the distinction between care/harm and fairness foundations in moral reasoning. He also discusses animal welfare, environmental issues, and historical views on charity and justice. The post includes insights from commenters on topics such as the philosophy of justice, Google search result estimates, and the tension between identifying injustice and creating effective change. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the ethical considerations of insect farming for food, questioning whether insects have moral value and how this impacts our ethical decisions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the moral implications of insect farming for food production. He explores the question of whether insects have moral value, citing scientific debates on insect pain perception and comparing the scale of insect farming to other forms of animal agriculture. The post touches on the environmental arguments for eating insects, the scale of wild insect suffering, and how considering insect welfare can influence our moral calibration. Scott uses a mix of scientific references, philosophical arguments, and humor to explore this complex ethical issue. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that eating beef is more ethical than chicken due to reduced animal suffering, despite higher environmental impact, and explores the complexities of this ethical calculus. Longer summary

Scott Alexander argues that eating beef is more ethical than eating chicken from an animal welfare perspective, despite beef's higher environmental impact. He calculates that switching from chicken to beef saves about 60 chickens per year at the cost of 2.2 tons extra CO2. Offsetting this carbon costs about $22 annually, which he argues is worthwhile given the reduction in animal suffering. He then explores the complexities of comparing direct action to offsetting, discussing potential market failures in offset pricing. Despite these complications, he concludes that eating beef over chicken is likely still the better ethical choice, especially if one is not actually performing the offsets. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the ethics of supporting formerly 'evil' companies that transition to more ethical practices, ultimately leaning towards supporting their new ventures. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the ethical dilemma of supporting formerly 'evil' companies that pivot to more ethical practices. He uses examples like Philip Morris moving to smoke-free cigarettes and KFC offering meatless options. The post discusses whether companies that profited from harmful practices should be allowed to profit again from ethical alternatives. Scott compares this to offering dictators comfortable retirements to encourage them to relinquish power. He ultimately leans towards supporting these companies' new ethical ventures, citing reasons such as the difficulty of predicting moral progress, the inconsistency of only boycotting visible offenders, and the practical challenges of effective boycotts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander partially retracts his previous post on animal value and neural number after a commenter's larger survey yielded different results. Longer summary

Scott Alexander partially retracts his previous post about animal value and neural number. A commenter, Tibbar, replicated Scott's survey using Mechanical Turk and obtained different results with a larger sample size. Scott acknowledges that while Mechanical Turk users might not be the ideal sample and some responses seem rushed, it's difficult to claim his original results represent a universal intuitive understanding. He explains that his original sample was more informed about animal rights issues. Scott adds this to his Mistakes page and considers including a similar survey in the future, hoping readers will have forgotten about this retraction. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander finds a correlation between animals' cortical neuron count and people's intuitive perception of their moral value, based on a small survey. Longer summary

This post explores the correlation between the number of cortical neurons in animals and humans' intuitive perceptions of their moral value. Scott Alexander conducted a survey asking people to estimate how many of each animal would equal one human in moral value. He then compared these results to the relative number of cortical neurons each animal has compared to humans. The results showed a surprisingly close match, with some exceptions like lobsters. Scott suggests this adds credibility to intuitive ways of thinking about animal moral value, though he acknowledges the need for further research with a larger, more representative sample. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of people 'nominating themselves for the short end of a tradeoff' through their actions, and how this relates to ideas of desert and justice, sometimes conflicting with utilitarian calculations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the concept of people 'nominating themselves for the short end of a tradeoff' through their actions, using three examples: an antidepressant with potential for abuse, a sexual harasser in a community, and basic income recipients who choose not to work. He explores how this concept relates to ideas of desert and justice, and how it sometimes conflicts with utilitarian calculations. The post grapples with the tension between utilitarian outcomes and the intuition that people who make bad choices should face the consequences, even if those consequences might be disproportionate to their actions. Scott considers various ways to reconcile or understand this tension, including viewing it as a misfiring heuristic, a revealed preference issue, or a necessary part of maintaining rule-based systems. Shorter summary

A fictional tale about choosing between cosmic principles when given ultimate power, ultimately satirizing decision paralysis and the concept of balance. Longer summary

This post is a fictional story about a person who finds an Artifact that grants mastery of the universe. The protagonist encounters a series of demon-like entities, each representing different philosophical concepts such as Order, Chaos, Balance, Excess, and various meta-levels of these ideas. Each entity tries to convince the protagonist to use the Artifact for their domain. The story becomes increasingly complex and absurd as more entities appear, presenting increasingly meta arguments about decision-making and balance. In the end, the protagonist, overwhelmed by the complexity, hastily chooses 'normal Balance' and destroys the Artifact. The story concludes with a reflection on the questionable wisdom of this choice and the protagonist's reluctance to spend more time on such an important decision. Shorter summary

Scott proposes that value differences arise from people crystallizing heuristics at different levels, rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible differences in values. Longer summary

Scott explores the idea that value differences stem from people operating at different levels of a conceptual ladder, from explicit models to emotional experiences to reified essences to endorsed values. He argues that this perspective can help people understand each other better, as differences often arise from where individuals choose to crystallize heuristics rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible value differences. The post discusses various examples of this process, from nutrition to punishment to environmental preservation, and examines factors that influence where people place themselves on this ladder, such as intelligence, education, and personal experience. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that fundamental value differences are less common and less aligned with political tribes than often assumed, emphasizing the need for coexistence despite varying values. Longer summary

Scott Alexander challenges the idea that fundamental value differences are a significant barrier to cooperation. He argues that many apparent value differences are actually factual disagreements or inconsistently applied principles. Using examples like foreign aid and immigration, he shows how people's values often shift based on context and convenience. Alexander suggests that while some fundamental value differences may exist, they don't necessarily align with political or cultural tribes. He concludes that since everyone has some value differences with everyone else, learning to coexist despite these differences is crucial. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the concept of 'laziness' and value differences, exploring how semantic debates can obscure practical communication and understanding. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'laziness' and debates about value differences. Through a dialogue between Sophisticus and Simplicio, he examines whether laziness exists, how to communicate about people with low motivation, and whether judgments about laziness are moral or practical. The post then extends to discuss punishment, evolutionary psychology, and the nature of value differences. It concludes with a metaphorical conversation about city centers, illustrating how semantic debates can obscure practical communication. Shorter summary

A dialogue critiques Michael Huemer's view on objective moral truths, arguing that moral changes are driven by wealth and societal conditions rather than convergence on objective truth. Longer summary

This post presents a dialogue between Achitophel and Berenice discussing Michael Huemer's view on objective moral truths. Berenice argues against Huemer's perspective, suggesting that changes in moral values are primarily driven by increasing wealth and changing societal conditions rather than a convergence on objective moral truth. She provides examples such as changes in fashion, the impact of disease prevalence on moral foundations, and the influence of economic factors on moral decisions. Achitophel initially defends Huemer's view but gradually concedes some points to Berenice's arguments. The dialogue concludes with a discussion on whether certain moral foundations, particularly Care/Harm, might be more fundamental than others. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores 'bicameral reasoning', comparing how we often weigh issues equally (like the US Senate) instead of proportionally to their importance (like the House), leading to potentially skewed decision-making. Longer summary

This post discusses the concept of 'bicameral reasoning', drawing parallels between the US House and Senate representation systems and how people make decisions or judgments. Scott Alexander argues that often we give equal weight to issues of vastly different importance, much like how the Senate gives equal representation to states regardless of population. He illustrates this with examples from political issues, animal welfare considerations, and environmental concerns. The post suggests that this 'Senate-like' thinking can lead to poor decision-making by equating minor issues with major ones. While acknowledging some potential benefits to this way of thinking in extreme cases, the author ultimately argues for a more proportional 'House-like' approach to evaluating issues based on their actual impact or importance. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes that academics blaming their own demographic for societal problems stems from a desire to justify helping others within their moral framework. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the paradox of academics from privileged backgrounds attributing societal problems to their own demographic group. He proposes that this behavior might stem from a fundamental human goodness, combined with a common moral framework he calls 'Moral Therapeutic Deontology'. This framework struggles to justify helping others without obligation, leading people to create reasons why suffering is their fault to align with their moral system. Scott suggests that utilitarianism offers a more straightforward justification for helping others without needing to assign blame, and argues this approach might be more effective in motivating aid without the drawbacks of identity-based guilt. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends the use of extreme thought experiments in moral philosophy, using Phil Robertson's controversial remarks as an example to explain their necessity and purpose. Longer summary

Scott Alexander defends the use of extreme thought experiments in moral philosophy, using Phil Robertson's controversial remarks about atheists as an example. He argues that such thought experiments, while disturbing, are necessary to tease out our true moral intuitions and principles. Scott explains that these scenarios are designed to be extreme to magnify small effects, similar to how physicists use extreme conditions to study fundamental laws. He emphasizes that engaging with such thought experiments doesn't mean philosophers endorse or fantasize about these scenarios, but rather use them as tools to explore complex ethical issues. Shorter summary

Scott discusses the challenge of incorporating animal welfare into effective altruism, proposing a balanced approach to expand moral circles while preserving sanity. Longer summary

Scott reflects on a discussion with Buck about animal welfare in effective altruism. The argument suggests that if animals have non-zero moral value, their welfare should vastly outweigh human concerns due to their numbers. Scott acknowledges the logic but struggles with fully accepting it. He compares this to the process of widening circles of concern, from self to family to community to all humanity. Scott concludes that he, like most people, never fully completes this process of expanding concern. Instead, he proposes a meta-consistent approach of allocating some resources to each new circle of concern while reserving the rest for sanity, allowing him to accept the importance of animal welfare without completely abandoning human-focused causes. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the concept of 'ethics offsets', exploring its applications and ethical implications from simple cases to extreme scenarios. Longer summary

This post explores the concept of 'ethics offsets', where people compensate for ethically questionable actions by performing good deeds. Scott starts with simple examples like carbon offsets, then moves to more complex scenarios involving vegetarianism and murder. He discusses the ethical implications and potential issues with this approach, such as the problem of universalizability and the crossing of moral boundaries. The post raises questions about the limits of ethical offsetting and whether it can justify any action if the positive impact is deemed greater than the negative. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that donating 10% of income to effective charities is a more impactful way to do good than political activism, and recommends joining Giving What We Can. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the moral obligation to engage in politics and activism, comparing it to other forms of doing good, particularly charitable giving. He argues that while many feel pressured to be politically active, donating money to effective charities is often a more impactful way to help others. The post suggests that instead of feeling guilty for not doing enough, people should aim to give 10% of their income to charity as a reasonable and achievable goal. This standard, promoted by organizations like Giving What We Can, is presented as a balanced approach to making a positive difference without falling into despair or inaction. Scott concludes by recommending readers consider joining Giving What We Can. Shorter summary

Scott examines why the rich appear to influence politics despite theoretical barriers, proposing that moral philosophies may emerge to solve wealthy coordination problems. Longer summary

This post explores the paradox of how the rich seem to influence politics despite the free-rider problem that should theoretically prevent such coordination. Scott starts by explaining why it's not in an individual rich person's self-interest to donate to political causes, even if the outcome would benefit them. He then proposes two possible explanations: either the rich influence politics through 'soft power', or they participate due to sincere moral beliefs that happen to align with their financial interests. The latter explanation leads to a fascinating hypothesis about how moral philosophies might 'spring up' to solve coordination problems among the wealthy. Scott concludes by noting the implications of this idea, including its potential application to other conspiracy theories and why the poor don't seem to coordinate as effectively. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines contractualism and its limitations using a thought experiment of 100 men with varying strengths, exploring how power dynamics affect moral agreements. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of contractualism in morality, using a thought experiment involving a society of 100 men with varying strengths. He examines how different agreements against oppression might be formed based on utility ratios and power differentials. The post then discusses why this model doesn't work due to game theory considerations, drawing parallels with the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Scott concludes by proposing some variations of the problem that might yield more interesting results, including random elements in interactions, meta-agreements, and coalitions. Shorter summary