Scott Alexander responds to comments on his post about criticism of EA, addressing various points about scientific paradigms, types of criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his previous post about criticism of EA. He addresses various points raised by commenters, including discussions about the nature of paradigm shifts in science, the value of specific vs. general criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Scott clarifies that he wasn't arguing EA only wants non-threatening criticism, but rather that some organizations genuinely want to improve. He also reflects on the challenges of distinguishing between expressing opinions and evangelizing, especially for philosophies that make unusual moral demands. Shorter summary

This review of Galen's 'On the Natural Faculties' challenges common misconceptions about the ancient physician, portraying him as more empirical and scientifically-minded than typically believed. Longer summary

This review explores Galen's 'On the Natural Faculties', providing context on Galen's life and work, and challenging common misconceptions about him. The author finds Galen to be more empirical and scientifically-minded than typically portrayed, with a nuanced understanding of biology and medicine for his time. The review discusses Galen's arguments against rival schools of thought, his emphasis on observation and experimentation, and his concept of 'Nature' as a precursor to evolutionary thinking. It also examines possible reasons for Galen's tarnished reputation in modern times, suggesting it may be due to later misinterpretations of his work or shifts in scientific paradigms. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander uses three fictional stories to illustrate principles of non-empirical scientific reasoning, ultimately applying them to support the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. Longer summary

This post presents three fictional stories to illustrate important points about non-empirical arguments in science. The first story shows that even when two theories make identical predictions, it's important to choose the simpler one. The second story demonstrates that determining which theory is simpler isn't always straightforward and requires philosophical understanding. The third story ties these concepts to quantum mechanics, arguing that the many-worlds interpretation is preferable to single-world interpretations based on these principles. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that non-empirical reasoning, based on principles like simplicity and elegance, is a necessary and legitimate part of scientific practice, even for evaluating seemingly untestable theories. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the role of non-empirical arguments in science, challenging the view that untestable theories are inherently unscientific. He argues that even in cases where direct empirical testing is impossible, scientists use principles like simplicity and elegance (often formalized as Occam's Razor) to evaluate competing theories. Scott uses examples ranging from paleontology vs. creationism to multiverse theories in physics to demonstrate that this type of reasoning is both necessary and legitimate in scientific practice. He concludes that while there may be debates about the best way to formalize or apply these principles, it's crucial to recognize that some form of non-empirical reasoning is an inescapable part of the scientific process. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues against the fear of angering simulators by testing if we're in a simulation, stating that competent simulators would prevent discovery or expect such tests as part of civilizational development. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques a New York Times article suggesting we should avoid testing whether we live in a simulation to prevent potential destruction by the simulators. He argues that this concern is unfounded for several reasons: 1) Any sufficiently advanced simulators would likely monitor their simulations closely and could easily prevent us from discovering our simulated nature. 2) Given the scale of simulations implied by the simulation hypothesis, our universe is likely not the first to consider such tests, and simulators would have contingencies in place. 3) Grappling with simulation-related philosophy is probably a natural part of civilizational development that simulators would expect and allow. While computational intensity might be a more valid concern, Scott suggests it's not something we need to worry about currently. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents highlights from reader comments on his review of Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', offering various perspectives and clarifications on Kuhn's ideas about scientific progress. Longer summary

This post highlights comments on Scott Alexander's review of Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions'. The comments provide additional context, clarifications, and perspectives on Kuhn's work. They discuss topics such as the nature of paradigm shifts, the relationship between different scientific theories, Kuhn's metaphysics, and the implications of his ideas for the philosophy of science. The post also includes an analogy comparing scientific progress to building skyscrapers, and touches on the debate between Kuhn and Popper's views on falsification in science. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents a 'Grand Unified Chart' showing how different domains of knowledge share a similar structure in interpreting the world, arguing this is due to basic brain algorithms and effective epistemology. Longer summary

Scott Alexander draws parallels between different domains of knowledge, showing how they all share a similar structure in interpreting the world. He presents a 'Grand Unified Chart' that compares Philosophy of Science, Bayesian Probability, Psychology, Discourse, Society, and Neuroscience. Each domain is broken down into three components: pre-existing ideas, discrepancies, and actual experiences. Scott argues that this structure is universal because it's built into basic brain algorithms and is the most effective way to do epistemology. He emphasizes that the interaction between facts and theories is bidirectional, and that theory change is a complex process resistant to simple contradictions. Shorter summary

Scott reviews Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions', finding its thesis on paradigm shifts in science intriguing but frustratingly vague, especially beyond physics. Longer summary

Scott reviews Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', which argues that science progresses through paradigm shifts rather than simple accumulation of facts. Kuhn posits that scientific paradigms are comprehensive worldviews that guide research and interpretation of data. When anomalies accumulate, a new paradigm may emerge to replace the old one. Scott finds Kuhn's thesis intriguing but frustratingly vague in parts, especially in applying it beyond physics. He draws connections between Kuhn's ideas and predictive coding in neuroscience, suggesting both describe how pre-existing mental structures shape perception and understanding. Overall, Scott sees value in Kuhn's perspective but wishes for more clarity and examples from other scientific fields. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander refutes a blog post criticizing rationalism, arguing it misunderstands the movement and its core values of empiricism, scholarship, and humility. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques a blog post titled 'Why I Am Not A Rationalist' on Almost Diamonds, arguing that it fundamentally misunderstands both classical rationalism (Descartes) and modern rationalism (Yudkowsky). He points out that the blog post accuses rationalists of lacking empiricism, scholarship, and humility, when these are in fact core values of the rationalist movement. Scott provides numerous examples to demonstrate the rationalist community's commitment to these principles. He concludes by explaining why rationality skills are necessary in addition to empirical knowledge, especially when dealing with limited or conflicting information. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander criticizes a Guardian article's flawed reasoning in claiming 'Limits to Growth' accurately predicts economic collapse, comparing it to the philosophical 'grue-bleen induction problem'. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques a Guardian article claiming that the 1972 book 'Limits to Growth' accurately predicted economic collapse. He argues that the article's reasoning is flawed, comparing it to the philosophical 'grue-bleen induction problem'. Scott demonstrates how easy it is to make accurate predictions about the past and present, but how this doesn't necessarily translate to accurate future predictions. He uses humorous examples like a fictional book 'No Limits To Bears' and creates alternative models for the data presented. The post concludes that while economic collapse might still happen, the Guardian's argument for it is not scientifically sound. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'Quantum Computing Since Democritus' by Scott Aaronson, sharing insights gained despite the book's complexity and his own mathematical limitations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews Scott Aaronson's book 'Quantum Computing Since Democritus', admitting he struggled to fully understand it due to its mathematical complexity. Despite this, he gained insights into quantum mechanics, computational complexity, and the nature of information in physics. The review highlights key passages and ideas from the book, including Aaronson's perspective on quantum mechanics as a generalization of probability theory and his views on artificial intelligence and consciousness. Alexander also reflects on his own mathematical limitations and the book's impact on his understanding of various scientific and philosophical concepts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends logical positivism, arguing that despite its flaws, it points to useful ideas about dividing meaningful statements into scientific and logical categories. Longer summary

Scott Alexander presents a defense of logical positivism, a philosophical stance generally considered outdated. He argues that while logical positivism may not be entirely correct, it points to a cluster of correct ideas. The post draws parallels between logical positivism, Hume's fork, and modern rationalist thinking, suggesting they all divide meaningful statements into something like science and something like logic. Scott argues this division is productive and helps identify meaningless statements. He then attempts to apply this framework to traditionally challenging areas like mathematics, morality, and counterfactuals. The post concludes by addressing the common criticism that logical positivism fails its own criteria, suggesting that its value might lie in its ability to facilitate productive debate. Shorter summary