Scott Alexander defends the concept of automaticity in psychology, arguing that core cognitive biases and priming effects are real, while acknowledging some claims have been overstated. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to a critique of automaticity in psychology, arguing that while some claims about cognitive biases and priming have been overstated, the core concepts are real and well-replicated. He provides examples of cognitive biases, priming effects, and nudges that have strong evidence behind them. Scott compares cognitive biases to optical illusions - real phenomena that affect our perception, but not in ways that make us completely helpless. He argues that automaticity is actually a very old idea about human nature, found in various philosophical and religious traditions. While we shouldn't see ourselves as completely controlled by unconscious forces, Scott suggests that accepting some level of automaticity in our cognition is both realistic and not necessarily problematic. Shorter summary

Scott clarifies his stance on conspiracy theories and expert trust, advocating for a nuanced approach that acknowledges both the value of expert opinion and the potential for misrepresentation. Longer summary

Scott revisits his previous post on fideism, addressing criticism and clarifying his stance on conspiracy theories and trusting experts. He presents three perspectives on conspiracy theories: Idiocy, Intellect, and Infohazard, and argues for a nuanced approach. Scott emphasizes that conspiracy theories can be convincing even to smart people, and that completely avoiding discussion of them is not always effective. He stresses the importance of trusting experts while also being aware of potential biases and misrepresentations. The post concludes with detailed advice on how to approach conspiracy theories and maintain a balanced perspective. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the use of absurdity arguments, reflecting on his critique of Neom and offering strategies to balance absurdity heuristics with careful reasoning. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reflects on his previous post mocking the Neom project, considering whether his use of the absurdity heuristic was justified. He explores the challenges of relying on absurdity arguments, acknowledging that everything ultimately bottoms out in such arguments. The post discusses when it's appropriate to use absurdity heuristics in communication and personal reasoning, and offers strategies for avoiding absurdity bias. These include calibration training, social epistemology, occasional deep dives into fact-checking, and examining why beliefs come to our attention. Scott concludes that while there's no perfect solution, these approaches can help balance the use of absurdity arguments with more rigorous thinking. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the Forer Effect, reframing common 'psychic' statements as insights about human nature and self-compassion tools. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the Forer Effect, a psychological trick used by astrologers and psychics. He analyzes a list of Forer statements, explaining why they seem accurate to most people. Scott then reframes these statements as potential updates to our understanding of others and as self-compassionate affirmations. He discusses how this relates to concepts of 'normies' and 'neurotypicals', and questions whether the perceived differences between these groups and others are real or imagined. The post ends with uncertainty about whether certain groups truly experience less interiority or if it's a matter of differing communication styles. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'The Scout Mindset' by Julia Galef, a book on rationality that emphasizes seeking truth over defending beliefs and addresses both intellectual and emotional aspects of clear thinking. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews Julia Galef's book 'The Scout Mindset', which aims to teach people how to think more clearly and rationally. The book distinguishes between 'soldier mindset' (defending one's beliefs) and 'scout mindset' (seeking truth). It provides techniques for adopting a scout mindset, including probabilistic thinking and thought experiments. The book also addresses the emotional challenges of changing one's mind and uses examples of admirable people who have done so to normalize the practice. Scott notes that the book goes beyond just teaching rationality techniques and touches on personal growth and becoming a better person. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines why some people struggle to acknowledge others' preferences that deviate from social norms, drawing from personal experiences and psychological theories. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the difficulty some people have in acknowledging others' preferences, especially when those preferences deviate from social norms. He recounts personal experiences with a B&B couple ignoring his friend's introversion and his grandmother dismissing his girlfriend's dislike of presents. Scott suggests this behavior might be more common among older, very nice people, possibly due to historical social conformity pressures or cognitive inflexibility. He compares this to common cognitive biases and emotional reasoning errors, and proposes that people who 'take ideas seriously' might be better at respecting unusual preferences. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes that confirmation bias might be a misapplication of normal Bayesian reasoning rather than a separate cognitive phenomenon. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses confirmation bias, suggesting it might not be a separate phenomenon from normal reasoning but rather a misapplication of Bayesian reasoning. He uses an example of believing a friend who reports seeing a coyote in Berkeley but disbelieving the same friend reporting a polar bear. Scott argues this is similar to how we process information that confirms or challenges our existing beliefs. He proposes that when faced with evidence contradicting strong priors, we should slightly adjust our beliefs while heavily discounting the new evidence. The post critiques an evolutionary psychology explanation of confirmation bias from a Fast Company article, suggesting instead that confirmation bias might be a result of normal reasoning processes gone awry rather than a distinct cognitive bias. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores 'epistemic learned helplessness', arguing it's often a rational defense against persuasive but false ideas, especially in unfamiliar fields. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the concept of 'epistemic learned helplessness', where people refuse to believe arguments even when they seem logically sound. He argues that this is often a rational response to the fact that convincing arguments can be made for many false ideas, especially in fields where one lacks expertise. The post explores how this relates to beliefs in pseudohistory, fundamentalist religion, and fringe scientific theories. Scott suggests that while some ability to seriously consider new ideas is valuable, for most people, most of the time, a degree of epistemic learned helplessness is actually beneficial as a defense against bad arguments. He notes that the smartest and most rational people are often best at taking ideas seriously, but suggests this might be because they're capable of doing so without immediately falling for bad arguments. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander introduces 'prospiracy theories', positive conspiracy-style memes designed to spread true and beneficial information, in response to the rapid spread of conspiracy theories on social media. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his previous post about conspiracy theories spreading faster than debunkings on Facebook. He presents a creative solution by creating 'prospiracy theories' - positive, uplifting conspiracy-style memes designed to spread true and beneficial information. The post includes four image examples of these prospiracy theories, covering topics like the benefits of exercise, the importance of sleep, the value of reading, and the positive impact of kindness. These images mimic the style of conspiracy theory memes but promote factual, beneficial information instead. Shorter summary

Scott proposes that value differences arise from people crystallizing heuristics at different levels, rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible differences in values. Longer summary

Scott explores the idea that value differences stem from people operating at different levels of a conceptual ladder, from explicit models to emotional experiences to reified essences to endorsed values. He argues that this perspective can help people understand each other better, as differences often arise from where individuals choose to crystallize heuristics rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible value differences. The post discusses various examples of this process, from nutrition to punishment to environmental preservation, and examines factors that influence where people place themselves on this ladder, such as intelligence, education, and personal experience. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander addresses feedback on his conflict vs. mistake theory post, acknowledging criticisms while defending the core concept's usefulness as a starting point for understanding different approaches to societal problems. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his post about conflict vs. mistake theory. He acknowledges valid criticisms while defending the core concept as useful, even if imperfect. Key points include: 1) The dichotomy is meant as a starting point for understanding, not a perfect description. 2) There's confusion between the theories and specific political ideologies that needs clarification. 3) The theories may be better understood as different perspectives or emphases rather than mutually exclusive worldviews. 4) Some commenters offer interesting alternative interpretations or applications of the concepts. 5) Scott reflects on the complexities around ideas of 'shilling' and bias in relation to the theories. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reflects on turning 33 and questions whether the changes in his thinking represent true wisdom or are the result of socialization, trauma, or neurological changes. Longer summary

In this post, Scott Alexander reflects on turning 33 and questions whether age truly brings wisdom. He lists several changes in his thinking that seem like wisdom, such as becoming more cynical, mellow, and believing things are complicated. However, he then questions whether these changes are actually wisdom or just better socialization, trauma-induced pessimism, or even neurological changes. He notes that his current views align more with elite opinion and wonders if this is due to genuine wisdom or social pressure. Scott also discusses how he's changed his stance on some issues, like religion, and questions whether this is true wisdom or just following intellectual trends. He concludes by acknowledging the difficulty in distinguishing true wisdom from other cognitive changes that come with age. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores potential links between perception of optical illusions and cognitive styles, proposing further research to investigate these connections. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the potential link between perception and cognition based on survey results about optical illusions. He notes that 'weirder' groups (e.g., schizophrenics, transhumanists, polyamorous people) tend to see more ambiguity in illusions like the Hollow Mask and Spinning Dancer. Scott proposes a research program to explore whether perception of optical illusions could predict cognitive biases or high-level beliefs. He plans to include more illusions in future surveys to better understand the underlying mental processes. While acknowledging the ambitiousness of this idea, he cites some supporting evidence, such as the involvement of NMDA receptors in both political opinions and illusion perception. Scott also considers potential confounding factors and how to address them in future research. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends Less Wrong and Eliezer Yudkowsky against accusations of being anti-scientific, arguing that developing rational thinking skills beyond traditional scientific methods is valuable and necessary. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Topher Hallquist's criticism of Less Wrong and Eliezer Yudkowsky as being 'anti-scientific rationality'. Scott argues that Hallquist's criticisms are often unfair or inaccurate, taking quotes out of context or misunderstanding Yudkowsky's positions. He defends the rationalist community's efforts to develop better thinking tools that go beyond traditional scientific methods, while still respecting science. Scott contends that developing an 'Art of Thinking Clearly' is valuable and necessary, especially for experts who have to make difficult judgments. He argues Less Wrong is not against science, but wants to strengthen and supplement it with additional rational thinking skills. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that rationality should be viewed as habit cultivation rather than a limited resource, drawing parallels with aikido and lucid dreaming techniques. Longer summary

Scott Alexander disagrees with Robin Hanson's view of rationality as a limited resource to be budgeted. Instead, he proposes that rationality should be treated as habit cultivation. He draws parallels between rationality and aikido training, as well as lucid dreaming techniques, emphasizing the importance of making rational thinking so natural that it becomes a default state even in challenging situations. Scott argues that cultivating these habits is crucial because irrationality, like dreaming, can depress one's ability to recognize when they're being irrational. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the process of 'crystallizing patterns' in thinking, discussing its benefits and potential pitfalls across various domains. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'crystallizing patterns' in thinking, using examples from the Less Wrong sequences and C.S. Lewis's writings. He discusses how naming and defining patterns can make them easier to recognize and think about, potentially changing how people view certain issues. The post examines whether this process can ever be wrong or counterproductive, concluding that while it can sometimes be misleading, it's generally beneficial if done carefully. Scott uses various examples to illustrate his points, including political correctness, mainstream media, and religious concepts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander contrasts two studies with opposite conclusions about stress, highlighting the inconsistency in how we interpret adversity's effects. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses two contradictory studies: one showing fat-shaming leads to weight gain, and another suggesting Holocaust survivors have greater life expectancy. He points out the potential flaws in both studies and the ease with which psychology can explain opposite outcomes. The post highlights how we often switch between contradictory narratives about stress and adversity, using them selectively to support various arguments. Scott emphasizes the importance of critical thinking when interpreting such studies and their implications. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses how the clarity experienced when awakening from meditation-induced delusions mirrors his appreciation for simplifying philosophical concepts. Longer summary

Scott Alexander describes his experiences with meditating while tired, which lead to increasingly complex and delusional thoughts. He then experiences a moment of awakening where he realizes the simplicity of the task. This feeling of clarity and simplification is compared to his passion for ideas like consequentialism, atheism, and capitalism, which provide similar moments of clarity in complex situations. While acknowledging that this feeling isn't an argument for these ideas, Scott expresses how fundamental this aesthetic is to his thinking. Shorter summary