Scott analyzes why people support government-funded foreign aid instead of donating voluntarily, examining and critiquing several theories including virtue signaling, coordination problems, and time-inconsistent preferences. Longer summary

Scott examines why people support government-funded foreign aid rather than just donating directly, pushing back against the 'other people's money' argument. He considers and critiques several explanations: the force multiplier theory (seizing opponents' money), virtue signaling through voting, psychological free-riding on knowing problems are solved, coordination problems requiring bundling, transaction costs that make voluntary systems impractical, and time-inconsistent preferences where people's long-term values differ from their moment-to-moment impulses. Scott concludes by proposing a thought experiment where tax forms include an opt-out box for foreign aid, predicting most people wouldn't use it, suggesting the issue is more complex than simply wanting to spend others' money. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander compares political spending to the almond industry, revealing surprisingly low amounts in politics due to coordination problems. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the surprisingly low amount of money in politics compared to other industries, using the almond industry as a benchmark. He notes that all US spending on candidates, PACs, lobbying, think tanks, and advocacy organizations combined is less than the annual revenue of the almond industry. The post examines various sectors of political spending and media properties, highlighting their relatively low monetary value. Scott discusses three reasons why this is surprising: ordinary people's political engagement, wealthy individuals' interests, and corporate influence post-Citizens United. He considers potential explanations, including Ansolabehere's argument about the ineffectiveness of political spending, but ultimately suggests that coordination problems are the main factor preventing more money from entering politics. The post concludes by drawing a parallel between political spending and charitable giving, arguing that the same coordination problems affect both areas. Shorter summary