The review examines arguments for increased government secrecy, suggesting that transparency may lead to negative outcomes and that a return to more opaque legislative processes could be beneficial. Longer summary

This book review examines Brian Kogelmann's argument for increased secrecy in government, particularly in legislative processes. The author argues that transparency, while intuitively appealing, can lead to negative outcomes such as increased influence of special interest groups and political grandstanding. The review explores the historical context, theoretical justifications, and potential drawbacks of secret deliberation, ultimately suggesting that a return to more opaque legislative processes could improve political outcomes. Shorter summary

Scott proposes politicians pledge to change prediction markets' forecasts instead of making direct outcome pledges, using Biden's emissions pledge as an example. Longer summary

Scott Alexander proposes that instead of making pledges about future outcomes, politicians should pledge to change prediction markets' forecasts about those outcomes. He uses Biden's pledge to halve US emissions by 2030 as an example, noting that such long-term pledges are often unfulfilled. Scott suggests that Biden could instead pledge to make Metaculus (or another prediction market) show a 51%+ chance of meeting the emissions target by the end of his term. This approach would require Biden to take concrete actions that convince forecasters of the likelihood of success. The post discusses potential objections to this idea, including the impact of future administrations, attempts to manipulate markets, and whether this might disrupt important political processes. Shorter summary