Scott Alexander rebuts Bryan Caplan's arguments about mental illness, criticizing the preference/constraint dichotomy and providing counterarguments to Caplan's claims. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Bryan Caplan's latest arguments about mental illness, criticizing Caplan's preference/constraint dichotomy and his claim that mental illnesses are just voluntary preferences. Scott argues that the distinction between preferences and constraints is not clear-cut, and that both physical and mental illnesses involve a mix of the two. He provides several counterarguments, including examples from physical illnesses, gradients of ability, and cases where the 'gun to the head' test fails. Scott also discusses how the framing of conditions as preferences or constraints depends on factors like ease of satisfaction and social norms. He concludes by rejecting Caplan's argument that one must either deny mental illness exists or classify homosexuality as a mental illness. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques Bryan Caplan's constraints vs preferences model of mental illness, proposing instead a goals vs urges framework that better explains both mental and physical health issues. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Bryan Caplan's critique of psychiatry, focusing on Caplan's distinction between constraints and preferences in mental illness. Scott argues that this model is flawed and doesn't accurately represent mental or even many physical illnesses. He proposes a more nuanced model based on goals (endorsed preferences) and urges (unendorsed preferences), using examples to show how this better explains behavior in both mental and physical health contexts. Scott concludes that this model allows for a more libertarian approach, supporting individuals in achieving their goals, whether through addressing constraints or managing urges. Shorter summary