Scott analyzes whether whole-body screening MRIs are worth it by doing a detailed cost-benefit calculation, finding they cost about $108,000 per quality-adjusted life-year saved (right around the threshold of cost-effectiveness), and argues that while rich people immune to anxiety might benefit, most people claiming to be rational about medical decisions probably aren't. Longer summary

Scott performs a detailed cost-benefit analysis of whole-body screening MRIs in response to controversy over medical experts recommending against them. Using rough order-of-magnitude estimates, he calculates that screening 1,000 people saves about 32 quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) at a cost of $2.7 million plus time and anxiety costs, working out to about $108,000 per QALY saved—right at the threshold of cost-effectiveness. He explores whether rich people who don't care about money should get screened, finding a plausible case but with many caveats about unknown factors that could swing the calculation either way. He then applies this analysis to Midjourney's proposed ultrasound scanner, finding it's unlikely to be clearly better than MRI. The post ends with a warning that people who think they're rational enough to ignore false positives are often the same people making irrational medical decisions based on contrarian appeals. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander analyzes the results of his utility and QALY survey, discussing interesting findings and the challenges of utility measurement. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the results of a utility and QALY survey he conducted. He notes several interesting findings, including a striking imbalance in respondents' last names, people's attitudes towards death, and differences in how single people and those in relationships view each other's situations. The post then delves into the utility calculations, noting that while the three methods used correlated inconsistently with each other, their averaged results were remarkably consistent. Scott also observes wide ranges in individual responses but similar preference orderings among respondents. He compares his results for blindness to established health research findings, concluding that while utility measurement is challenging, his test seems as valid as others. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander creates an amateur utility measurement test to explore the feasibility of comparing utilities in utilitarianism, inviting readers to participate despite its limitations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the feasibility of measuring and comparing utilities in utilitarianism. He mentions a searchable database of health outcome utilities at Tufts, but notes its limitations. Frustrated by the lack of utility measurements for non-health states, Scott creates his own amateur utility measurement test. He invites readers to participate in this 15-30 minute survey, acknowledging its confusing nature but encouraging participants to guess his intentions and skip unclear questions. Shorter summary