Scott Alexander reports on a 1990s Buddhist sun miracle in Bangkok that closely resembles the famous 1917 Fatima miracle, suggesting sun miracles may be a specific psychological phenomenon related to meditation practices rather than divine intervention. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses a newly discovered 1990s Buddhist sun miracle in Bangkok that closely parallels the famous 1917 Fatima sun miracle in Portugal, where crowds reported seeing the sun spin and change colors. At the Dhammakaya Temple, 20,000 people witnessed similar phenomena during a ceremony, with testimonies describing the sun rotating, shifting colors, and displaying visions of their sect's founder. Scott argues this Buddhist case - occurring in an 'uncontaminated' religious context - strengthens the theory that sun miracles are a particular psychological/illusory phenomenon rather than divine intervention or simple suggestion, possibly related to kasina meditation practices. The post includes a call for Thai-speaking researchers to investigate further. Shorter summary

A detailed investigation of the Sun Miracle of Fatima in 1917, where 70,000 people witnessed the sun appear to spin, change colors, and fall to earth, analyzing witness testimonies, skeptical explanations, and similar phenomena at other Marian apparition sites. Longer summary

Scott conducts an extensive investigation into the 1917 Miracle of the Sun at Fatima, where tens of thousands witnessed what appeared to be the sun spinning, changing colors, and falling to earth. He examines approximately 60 primary testimonies, evaluates common skeptical explanations (optical phenomena, weather events, mass hallucination), and documents similar sun miracles at other Marian apparition sites worldwide. Scott then critiques Dalleur's theory about distant witnesses and shadow analysis, explores why more people don't see these phenomena normally, and proposes a tentative materialist explanation involving a rare optical illusion modulated by cloud cover and social priming. The post ends by suggesting research directions for those interested in further investigation. Shorter summary

Scott argues that philosophical zombies (beings without consciousness) would still report having qualia and conscious experiences, challenging a key argument in the p-zombie debate. Longer summary

Scott Alexander challenges a core argument in the philosophical zombie debate by suggesting that p-zombies (beings without consciousness) would still report having qualia and conscious experiences, just like humans do. He walks through how p-zombies would process and describe visual information, showing that they would need to use language similar to how we describe conscious experience. The post explores the implications of this for various philosophical positions on consciousness, though it acknowledges remaining difficulties in explaining subjective experience. Shorter summary