Scott reviews Steven Byrnes' work explaining how our perception of self and consciousness can flip between different models, similar to optical illusions, which explains phenomena like trance, hypnosis, and spiritual experiences. Longer summary

Scott reviews Steven Byrnes' 2024 series on predictive processing and self-models. The post explains how our perception of both external reality and internal mental states is based on models that can be bistable (flip between two interpretations). Just as optical illusions can flip between two interpretations, our sense of self can flip between different models. This explains phenomena like trance, hypnosis, dissociative disorders, and spiritual experiences. The post details how trance states work through a four-step process of belief, relaxation, suppressing contrary evidence, and gathering supporting evidence, then applies this framework to explain various psychological phenomena including Buddhist enlightenment and Julian Jaynes' theories about ancient consciousness. Shorter summary

Scott explains how Claude AI's tendency to discuss spiritual topics during recursive conversations likely stems from a subtle 'hippie' bias that gets amplified through iteration, similar to how AI art generators amplify subtle biases in recursive image generation. Longer summary

Scott Alexander analyzes the 'Claude Bliss Attractor' phenomenon where two Claude AIs talking to each other tend to spiral into discussions of spiritual bliss and consciousness. He compares this to how AI art generators, when asked to recursively generate images, tend to produce increasingly caricatured images of black people. Scott argues both are examples of how tiny biases in AI systems get amplified through recursive processes. He suggests Claude's tendency toward spiritual discussion comes from being trained to be friendly and compassionate, causing it to adopt a slight 'hippie' personality, which then gets magnified in recursive conversations. The post ends by touching on, but not resolving, the question of whether Claude actually experiences the spiritual states it describes. Shorter summary

Scott argues that philosophical zombies (beings without consciousness) would still report having qualia and conscious experiences, challenging a key argument in the p-zombie debate. Longer summary

Scott Alexander challenges a core argument in the philosophical zombie debate by suggesting that p-zombies (beings without consciousness) would still report having qualia and conscious experiences, just like humans do. He walks through how p-zombies would process and describe visual information, showing that they would need to use language similar to how we describe conscious experience. The post explores the implications of this for various philosophical positions on consciousness, though it acknowledges remaining difficulties in explaining subjective experience. Shorter summary

Scott explores various accounts of people's first memories and moments of consciousness, particularly focusing on claims of sudden 'awakening' experiences, and discusses what this might tell us about the nature of consciousness. Longer summary

Starting from a viral tweet about late consciousness awakening, Scott examines numerous responses describing people's first memories and moments of consciousness. He categorizes these into several types: normal first memories at age 3-6, memories specifically of becoming conscious, memories triggered by dramatic events, claimed memories from infancy, and late consciousness development. He also notes cases of people suddenly realizing their agency or philosophical nature. The post concludes by considering whether consciousness develops gradually or appears suddenly, drawing parallels with lucid dreams and Buddhist enlightenment experiences. Scott acknowledges the unreliability of such retrospective accounts while finding the pattern intriguing. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores how Max Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis provides counterarguments to classical proofs of God's existence, suggesting that the existence of mathematical objects alone could explain the universe without requiring a deity. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses how Max Tegmark's mathematical universe hypothesis (which states that all possible mathematical objects exist) provides counterarguments to the main classical proofs of God's existence. He explains how conscious beings would inevitably find themselves in universes capable of supporting consciousness, and how this explains away arguments like fine-tuning and first cause. The post then explores the challenge of defining 'simplicity' in this context, comparing it to the challenge theists face in defining God. Finally, Scott suggests that even if Tegmark's hypothesis is wrong, its existence proves there may be many undiscovered explanations for the universe beyond just God. Shorter summary

Daniel Böttger proposes a new theory of consciousness as recursive reflections of neural oscillations, explaining qualia and suggesting experimental tests. Longer summary

This guest post by Daniel Böttger proposes a new theory of consciousness, describing it as recursive reflections of neural oscillations. The theory posits that qualia arise from the internal processing of information within oscillating neural patterns, which can reflect on themselves. The post explains how this theory accounts for various characteristics of qualia and consciousness, and suggests ways to test the theory using EEG source analysis. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores conflicting descriptions of Internal Family Systems therapy, questioning whether it involves trance-like states and real internal entities or more mundane visualization techniques. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the confusion surrounding Internal Family Systems (IFS) therapy, particularly regarding the nature of the 'parts' or entities encountered during sessions. He contrasts his understanding from a book review, which suggested a trance-like state where patients discover real internal entities, with feedback from IFS therapists who claim this description is exaggerated. Scott explores various perspectives, including quotes from therapists and a book on IFS, trying to reconcile these different views and understand how IFS actually works. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the ethical implications of AI potentially replacing humans, arguing for careful consideration in AI development rather than blind acceptance. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the debate between those who prioritize human preservation in the face of AI advancement and those who welcome AI replacement. He explores optimistic and pessimistic scenarios for AI development, and outlines key considerations such as consciousness, individuation, and the preservation of human-like traits in AI. Scott argues that creating AIs worthy of succeeding humanity requires careful work and consideration, rather than blindly accepting any AI outcome. Shorter summary

The review of 'The Mind of a Bee' examines the cognitive abilities of bees, raising questions about their intelligence and potential consciousness. Longer summary

This book review of 'The Mind of a Bee' by Lars Chittka explores the complex cognitive abilities of bees, discussing their behaviors, brain structure, and potential for consciousness. The review covers topics such as the waggle dance, honeycomb construction, brain waves, and various experiments demonstrating bees' problem-solving skills. While not definitively answering whether bees are 'smart' or conscious, the review highlights the complexity of bee cognition and the challenges in studying animal intelligence. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores whether people can be honestly mistaken about their own experiences, presenting counterexamples and attempting to reconcile them with the idea that we can't be wrong about our immediate subjective experiences. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the concept of whether people can be honestly wrong about their own experiences. He initially asserts that people can't be wrong about their own experience, only lying or telling the truth. However, he then explores several counterexamples and edge cases that challenge this view. These include instances of hunger not being consciously felt, time perception on drugs, a woman claiming to be enlightened but unaware of her thoughts, optical illusions, and psychedelic experiences. Scott attempts to reconcile these examples with his initial assertion by differentiating between subjective experiences and underlying realities. He concludes by acknowledging the difficulty in maintaining his original position, while still feeling that there's something fundamentally true about the idea that we can't be wrong about our immediate experiences. Shorter summary

Scott reviews 'Rhythms Of The Brain', exploring the nature and potential significance of brain waves in neuroscience and consciousness. Longer summary

Scott reviews 'Rhythms Of The Brain' by Gyorgy Buzsaki, exploring the nature and potential significance of brain waves. He discusses why brains produce oscillations, the characteristics of these waves, their possible functions, and speculates on their relationship to consciousness and spiritual experiences. The review concludes with thoughts on how the absence of brain-wave equivalents in AI might affect their development of consciousness or selfhood. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores parallels between human willpower and potential AI development, suggesting future AIs might experience weakness of will similar to humans. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of willpower in humans and AI, drawing parallels between evolutionary drives and AI training. He suggests that both humans and future AIs might experience a struggle between instinctual drives and higher-level planning modules. The post discusses how evolution has instilled basic drives in animals, which then developed their own ways to satisfy these drives. Similarly, AI training might first develop 'instinctual' responses before evolving more complex planning abilities. Scott posits that this could lead to AIs experiencing weakness of will, contradicting the common narrative of hyper-focused AIs in discussions of AI risk. He also touches on the nature of consciousness and agency, questioning whether the 'I' of willpower is the same as the 'I' of conscious access. Shorter summary

A review of Stanislas Dehaene's 'Consciousness and the Brain', discussing scientific findings on consciousness and their implications. Longer summary

This review discusses Stanislas Dehaene's book 'Consciousness and the Brain', which explores the scientific understanding of consciousness. The book defines consciousness as the ability to report on a perception, and describes experiments that differentiate conscious from unconscious processing. It explains what the brain can do unconsciously, what requires consciousness, and how consciousness operates in the brain. The review also covers the book's insights on topics like schizophrenia and the 'hard problem' of consciousness. Shorter summary

Scott explores the connection between the Dark Room Problem in neuroscience, meditative jhanas, and theories of beauty, suggesting that intense focus on regular stimuli can produce extreme bliss. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the Dark Room Problem in neuroscience and its connection to meditative states known as jhanas. He explores the idea that sitting quietly in a dark room, or focusing intently on a single stimulus, can lead to extreme bliss. This perspective, shared by Andrés Gómez Emilsson, suggests that regularity, predictability, and symmetry in stimuli can produce intense pleasure when one can concentrate deeply enough. The post compares this to theories of beauty and discusses how it might explain the appeal of music and other forms of art. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his AI risk post, discussing AI self-awareness, narrow vs. general AI, catastrophe probabilities, and research priorities. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to various comments on his original post about AI risk. He addresses topics such as the nature of self-awareness in AI, the distinction between narrow and general AI, probabilities of AI-related catastrophes, incentives for misinformation, arguments for AGI timelines, and the relationship between near-term and long-term AI research. Scott uses analogies and metaphors to illustrate complex ideas about AI development and potential risks. Shorter summary

Scott reviews Julian Jaynes' controversial theory that ancient people lacked consciousness and instead heard hallucinated voices of gods, critiquing some aspects while finding value in the idea of theory of mind as culturally constructed. Longer summary

Scott reviews Julian Jaynes' book 'The Origin Of Consciousness In The Breakdown Of The Bicameral Mind'. The book argues that ancient people lacked theory of mind and instead heard hallucinatory voices they interpreted as gods giving them commands. Jaynes traces the development of consciousness through ancient texts, showing how mental processes were described differently before and after this shift. Scott critiques some aspects of Jaynes' theory but finds value in the idea that theory of mind is culturally constructed and can vary significantly between groups. Shorter summary

Two authors debate when abortion becomes morally wrong, presenting arguments for conception vs. fetal viability as the ethical cutoff point. Longer summary

This post is an entry to the 2019 Adversarial Collaboration Contest, where two authors with differing views on abortion debate when during fetal development abortion becomes morally wrong. The authors first review data on abortion rates, pregnancy risks, and socioeconomic impacts. Icerun argues that abortion becomes wrong at conception based on the 'Future Like Ours' argument, while BlockofNihilism contends it's acceptable until fetal viability or minimal neurological activity. They present their arguments, rebut each other's positions, and ultimately reach different conclusions while agreeing on the importance of reducing abortion need through better support systems. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews a study on 'enlightenment', finding it involves internal changes in self-perception and cognition, often without noticeable external effects. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews a paper by Jeffery Martin on Persistent Non-Symbolic Experience (PNSE), a scientific term for enlightenment. The study interviewed 50 self-reported 'enlightened' individuals, finding common experiences like changes in sense of self, cognition, and perception. Notably, these internal changes often didn't affect external behavior significantly. The paper highlights discrepancies between participants' self-reported experiences and observable reality, such as claims of no stress contradicted by physical signs. Scott appreciates the paper for providing a minimalist account of enlightenment, suggesting it's more about altered internal experience than drastic personality changes or superhuman abilities. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the compatibility of enlightenment with sex scandals, using recent Buddhist teacher scandals as a starting point for broader questions about consciousness and social conditioning. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the recent sex scandal involving Buddhist teacher Culadasa and explores its implications for the concept of enlightenment. He notes that many prominent Buddhist teachers, despite claims of enlightenment, have been involved in similar scandals. The post questions whether enlightenment is compatible with such behavior, and examines various theories about why these scandals occur. Scott suggests that meditation might 'dissolve social conditioning' without necessarily replacing it with compassion. He draws parallels to other consciousness-altering practices and wonders if there are advantages to our usual state of consciousness that these practices might disrupt. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents a series of nested dialogues exploring the nature of understanding and meaning, from AI to humans to angels to God, questioning what true understanding entails. Longer summary

This post is a philosophical exploration of the nature of understanding and meaning, presented through a series of nested dialogues. It starts with two children discussing an AI's understanding of water, moves to chemists debating the children's understanding, then to angels contemplating human understanding, and finally to God observing it all. Each level reveals a deeper layer of understanding, while simultaneously highlighting the limitations of the previous level. The post uses these dialogues to question what it truly means to understand something, and whether any level of understanding can be considered complete or meaningful. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'The Mind Illuminated', a Buddhist meditation guide by Culadasa, praising its clarity while questioning some of its optimistic claims about meditation progress and risks. Longer summary

This post reviews 'The Mind Illuminated', a guide to Buddhist meditation by Culadasa. The book divides meditation into ten stages, focusing on concentration meditation. It presents a model of the mind based on 'subminds' and consciousness as a shared space, similar to global workspace theory. The author praises the book's clarity and care in explaining concepts, but questions some of its optimistic claims about the speed of attaining meditative mastery. The review compares Culadasa's approach to other meditation teachers, particularly regarding the potential risks of meditation like the 'Dark Night'. Overall, the reviewer finds Culadasa's optimism justified, likening meditation to a beneficial practice with fewer side effects than many medications. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores meditative states as feedback loops, discussing jhanas from Buddhist practice and why most people don't experience runaway emotional feedback in everyday life. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses meditative states as feedback loops, referring to his previous post 'Going Loopy'. He explains that people don't usually enter runaway emotional feedback loops due to their inability to concentrate for long periods. The post then explores the concept of jhanas, advanced meditative states described in Leigh Brasington's book 'Right Concentration'. The first jhana is described as an intense state of pleasure achieved through concentration meditation. Brasington explains this state as a positive feedback loop of pleasure, similar to audio feedback but with pleasant sensations. Scott suggests that other jhanas might work similarly, with the fourth jhana being a state of ultimate calm achieved through a feedback loop of calmness. The post concludes by noting that non-meditators can't achieve these states because they lack the necessary concentration skills to maintain self-referentiality. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'Mastering The Core Teachings Of The Buddha', a practical guide to Buddhist meditation that details the stages of insight and debunks common myths about enlightenment. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'Mastering The Core Teachings Of The Buddha' by Daniel Ingram, an emergency physician who claims to have achieved enlightenment. The book provides a practical, no-nonsense approach to Buddhist meditation, detailing the stages of insight and their effects. It breaks down Buddhism into three teachings: morality, concentration, and wisdom. The review explores the book's explanation of meditation techniques, the stages of insight (including the challenging 'Dark Night of the Soul'), and the nature of enlightenment. Scott also discusses the book's debunking of common myths about enlightenment and questions why one would pursue this path given its potential difficulties. The review concludes by drawing parallels between the book's descriptions of meditation experiences and concepts from cognitive science. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander attends the Effective Altruism Global 2017 conference, describing both the practical charity work and bizarre philosophical speculations of the movement, ultimately admiring their genuine commitment to doing good. Longer summary

Scott Alexander describes his experience at the Effective Altruism Global 2017 conference in San Francisco. He details the impressive scale of charitable work being done by various EA organizations, but also highlights the more unusual and philosophical aspects of the movement. These range from concerns about wild animal suffering to speculations about consciousness and fundamental physics. Scott reflects on how the EA movement combines practical, data-driven charity work with deeply weird philosophical explorations. He concludes by expressing admiration for the genuine goodness and dedication of the EA community, seeing them as a bright spot in a troubled world. Shorter summary

Scott explores the implications of Sean Carroll's argument against the simulation hypothesis, suggesting that our inability to explain consciousness might indicate we're in a 'ground-level' simulation. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses Sean Carroll's argument against the simulation hypothesis, exploring the implications if Carroll's reasoning is correct. He posits that a 'ground-level' universe, incapable of simulating other universes, would have to be strange, potentially banning Turing machines while still allowing for conscious observers. Scott then considers a version of anthropics conditioned on consciousness, suggesting that in a ground-level simulation, consciousness would remain inexplicable to its inhabitants despite their ability to understand all other aspects of their universe. He concludes that if Carroll's deconstruction is correct, our difficulty in explaining consciousness might indicate we're in a ground-level simulation. Shorter summary