Scott Alexander dissects and criticizes a common argument against AI safety that compares it to past unfulfilled disaster predictions, finding it logically flawed and difficult to steelman. Longer summary

Scott Alexander analyzes a common argument against AI safety concerns, which compares them to past unfulfilled predictions of disaster (like a 'coffeepocalypse'). He finds this argument logically flawed and explores possible explanations for why people make it. Scott considers whether it's an attempt at an existence proof, a way to trigger heuristics, or a misunderstanding of how evidence works. He concludes that he still doesn't fully understand the mindset behind such arguments and invites readers to point out if he ever makes similar logical mistakes. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander describes 'fallacies of reversed moderation,' where moderate positions are misinterpreted as extreme opposites of the consensus view. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses a pattern he calls 'fallacies of reversed moderation.' This occurs when a popular consensus holds an extreme view (100% X, 0% Y), and when someone suggests a more moderate position (e.g., 90% X, 10% Y), they are accused of holding the opposite extreme view (100% Y, 0% X). He provides several examples of this pattern, including in climate change solutions, nature vs. nurture debates, and AI risk assessment. Scott explains why this pattern might occur and acknowledges its occasional validity, but argues that it's often used incorrectly. He suggests that critics should address the actual argument rather than mischaracterizing it as an extreme position. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes a hierarchy of types of disagreements, from low-level meta-debate to high-level philosophical differences, and discusses how to engage in more productive arguments. Longer summary

Scott Alexander proposes a hierarchy of types of disagreements, expanding on Paul Graham's earlier work. He categorizes disagreements from meta-debate and social shaming at the bottom, through gotchas, single facts, and single studies, up to good-faith surveys of evidence and high-level generators of disagreement at the top. The post explains each level, discusses how to recognize and handle them, and suggests that engaging in higher-level disagreements can lead to mutual respect and potentially shift deeply held beliefs over time. Scott emphasizes the rarity of high-level disagreements in public discourse and the importance of understanding this hierarchy for more productive debates. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'The Anti-Racialist Q&A', praising its approach to arguing against racism and its display of epistemic virtue. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews 'The Anti-Racialist Q&A', an essay by blogger The Prussian on SkepticInk. He finds it astounding for several reasons: it's good enough to warrant specific criticisms, the author's political leanings are unclear, it aims to actually convince people, and it might be one of the first pieces Scott has read that argues against racism rather than just condemning it. Scott praises the essay's approach as showing epistemic virtue, though he doesn't agree with everything in it. He encourages readers to give The Prussian more traffic for this ambitious work. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander outlines and criticizes ten fallacious argument styles that misrepresent an opponent's beliefs, demonstrating how they can be used to unfairly attack any position. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques a series of argument styles that misrepresent an opponent's position by exaggerating or distorting their belief. He presents ten variations of this fallacious reasoning, each escalating the misrepresentation in a different way. These range from likening a belief to religious faith, to suggesting that holding a belief implies extreme fanaticism or hatred of opponents. The post concludes with a densely packed example combining all ten argument styles, using the mundane topic of wearing coats in cold weather to demonstrate how absurd these arguments can become when applied to any belief. Scott clarifies that while some of these issues can be real problems, these argument styles are 'fully general' and can be used to attack any position unfairly. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores the 'Proving Too Much' fallacy as an efficient tactic to quickly dismantle complex arguments, particularly those using Dark Arts techniques. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the fallacy of 'Proving Too Much', where an argument is challenged because it proves both its intended conclusion and obviously false conclusions. He praises this tactic for its ability to quickly dismantle complex arguments, particularly those using Dark Arts techniques. Scott provides examples of how this method can be applied to various philosophical arguments, including deontological reasoning about abortion and Pascal's Wager. He emphasizes the efficiency of this approach in debates and its power to cut through complicated issues that might otherwise be irresolvable. Shorter summary