Scott's monthly links roundup covering AI progress, the coming flood of philanthropic funding to effective altruism from AI companies, new research on persuasion and forecasting, and various scientific and cultural topics ranging from dementia prevention to Romanian politicians' embarrassing quotes. Longer summary

This is the second part of Scott Alexander's monthly links roundup for July 2026, covering a wide range of topics including AI developments, effective altruism funding waves, healthcare research, and cultural curiosities. Major themes include Chinese AI models catching up to the US (though still 6-12 months behind), the coming "third wave" of American philanthropy from AI company equity donations potentially flooding effective altruism with $40 billion/year, AI systems now outperforming humans at persuasion in specific contexts, and various scientific findings from dementia prevention to infinite ethics. The post maintains Scott's characteristic style of jumping between serious technical analysis, historical oddities, and humorous observations, with extensive linking to sources and ongoing debates in the rationalist and effective altruist communities. Shorter summary

Scott responds to three concerns about embryo selection: embryo personhood rights, loss of trait diversity, and the ethics of preventing disabilities, arguing that none of these objections are fatal to the technology. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to three major concerns about embryo selection raised in response to a previous post. First, he addresses whether embryos have personhood rights, arguing that embryos lack the qualities (consciousness, intelligence, etc) that make humans morally valuable. He refutes various counterarguments about potential personhood and responds to edge cases like sleeping hermits. Second, he discusses concerns about trait diversity, arguing that the technology's limited power and slow adoption mean diversity concerns are premature. Third, he addresses the ethics of telling disabled people you'd prefer they didn't exist, comparing it to other situations where we try to prevent certain conditions without devaluing existing people. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that altruism and vitalism mostly align in practice, and that focusing on their theoretical divergences often stems from signaling rather than genuine pursuit of societal improvement. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to critiques of his understanding of the Nietzschean objection to altruism, particularly the idea that vitalism (maximizing life, glory, and strength) is superior. He argues that in most normal cases, altruism and vitalism suggest the same solutions, and their apparent divergence only occurs in extreme, unrealistic scenarios. Scott suggests that both philosophies, when taken to extremes, lead to absurd outcomes. He expresses suspicion towards those who focus too much on the divergence between altruism and vitalism in normal cases, arguing that such focus often stems from a desire to signal toughness rather than genuinely pursuing societal strength. The post concludes by challenging vitalists to 'pretend to really try' in implementing their philosophy, suggesting that this would likely lead to outcomes similar to those pursued by altruists. Shorter summary