Scott argues that virtue ethics is not merely intuitive morality and that relying on intuition alone fails to address complex ethical dilemmas. Longer summary

Scott critiques the idea that virtue ethics is simply using intuitive moral sense. He outlines five key claims of virtue ethics, arguing these are not intuitive for most people. He then discusses the limitations of relying solely on intuitive morality, pointing out that moral philosophy is needed precisely for situations where intuition fails or conflicts arise. The post concludes that while intuitive morality is useful for obvious cases, it doesn't solve the complex ethical dilemmas that moral philosophy aims to address. Shorter summary

Scott argues for the value of studying historical philosophy by 'reading it backwards' to unlearn assumptions and broaden perspective, even when past ideas seem obviously wrong. Longer summary

This post explores the value of studying historical philosophy, even when it seems outdated or wrong. Scott initially criticizes philosophy courses for teaching ideas that are obviously incorrect. However, he then proposes a new approach: reading philosophy backwards. This means starting with modern ideas and using historical texts to understand how controversial these ideas once were. The post argues that this method helps unlearn assumptions, broaden perspective, and prepare for future philosophical developments. Scott uses examples like Sartre, Hobbes, and Aristotle to illustrate how this approach can reveal the non-obviousness of current beliefs and expand our ability to consider radically different ideas. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques Alasdair MacIntyre's 'After Virtue', finding fault with its arguments for virtue ethics and its historical claims about morality in ancient societies. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews Alasdair MacIntyre's book 'After Virtue', criticizing its central arguments and historical claims. He finds MacIntyre's critique of modern moral philosophy somewhat valid but disagrees with the proposed solution of virtue ethics. Scott argues that virtue ethics is particularly ill-suited to solve moral dilemmas, contrary to MacIntyre's claims. He also challenges MacIntyre's historical narrative, pointing out that the problems MacIntyre attributes to modern society were present in ancient Greek society as well. Scott expresses confusion about why MacIntyre is so highly regarded, comparing him unfavorably to Edward Feser, another philosopher with similar views but whose arguments Scott found more coherent and illuminating. Shorter summary