Scott examines whether reported increases in "crime" actually reflect concerns about "disorder" (litter, graffiti, shoplifting, homelessness, tent encampments), finding that most disorder metrics are either stable or down from historical highs, contradicting narratives of societal collapse. Longer summary

Scott investigates the theory that public concern about rising crime is actually proxy concern about rising disorder (litter, graffiti, shoplifting, homelessness, tent encampments, boom boxes). He systematically examines data for each type of disorder and finds that most are either down from historical highs or only modestly increased from recent lows. Litter is down since the 1970s, graffiti is unclear but likely down in most places, shoplifting is up 20% from lows but still below 1990s levels, and homelessness is up 25% but equal to 1990s levels. He proposes four theories for why people perceive disorder as rising: the small 2020 bump, white people returning to cities through gentrification, romanticization of the unique 1930s-1960s crime minimum, and different forms of disorder in past versus present. Scott concludes by distinguishing between specific, evidence-based concerns about particular problems versus vague civilizational collapse narratives, arguing the former is both more accurate and more conducive to normal life. Shorter summary

Scott reviews comments on his vibecession post, exploring when it started, whether it's really about economics or culture, and notably finding that China experiences similar pessimism despite 5-10x income growth, suggesting vibes can be completely divorced from economic reality. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews and discusses comments on his previous post about the 'vibecession' (the disconnect between good economic indicators and negative public sentiment). The discussion covers when the vibecession actually started, whether economic complaints are proxies for cultural dissatisfaction, housing and inflation concerns, international comparisons (especially China's similar phenomenon despite massive economic growth), and concludes that vibes may be genuinely divorced from economic reality, though housing prices and partisan political feelings play significant roles. Shorter summary

Scott examines why young people feel economically hopeless despite economists saying things are fine, testing various explanations like housing costs and wages, and concluding the truth involves both real factors (harder competition, expensive cities, recent mortgage spikes) and media-driven negativity. Longer summary

Scott Alexander investigates the 'vibecession' - the paradox where economic indicators show improvement but consumer sentiment is terrible, particularly among young people who feel permanently locked out of opportunity. He systematically examines various proposed explanations including declining wages, housing costs, inflation miscalculation, inequality, and debt, finding that none fully explain the phenomenon. His analysis suggests the crisis may be partly real (increased effort required for same outcomes, concentration of jobs in expensive cities, recent mortgage increases) but also partly driven by increasingly negative media coverage and changing consumption patterns toward more conspiratorial sources. Shorter summary