Scott Alexander defends the concept of automaticity in psychology, arguing that core cognitive biases and priming effects are real, while acknowledging some claims have been overstated. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to a critique of automaticity in psychology, arguing that while some claims about cognitive biases and priming have been overstated, the core concepts are real and well-replicated. He provides examples of cognitive biases, priming effects, and nudges that have strong evidence behind them. Scott compares cognitive biases to optical illusions - real phenomena that affect our perception, but not in ways that make us completely helpless. He argues that automaticity is actually a very old idea about human nature, found in various philosophical and religious traditions. While we shouldn't see ourselves as completely controlled by unconscious forces, Scott suggests that accepting some level of automaticity in our cognition is both realistic and not necessarily problematic. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines a failed replication of a study claiming analytical thinking promotes religious disbelief, and discusses the broader implications for understanding the relationship between thinking styles and religious belief. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews a study by Gervais and Norenzayan (G&N) that claimed analytical thinking promotes religious disbelief, and its subsequent failed replication attempts. The original study consisted of five experiments, including priming participants with images or word tasks before assessing their religious beliefs. The Reproducibility Project's replication of two of these experiments failed to find the same effects. Scott discusses the implications of this failure, noting that even studies that seem well-designed can fail to replicate. He then examines a meta-analysis by Pennycook et al. that found a small but consistent correlation between analytical thinking and irreligiosity across multiple studies. Scott concludes by summarizing key takeaways about the relationship between analytical thinking, IQ, and religious belief, as well as lessons about the replicability of psychological studies. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques a Buzzfeed article skeptical of growth mindset research, arguing that while skepticism is warranted, more robust evidence is needed to disprove the theory. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses a Buzzfeed article criticizing growth mindset research, particularly the work of Carol Dweck. While acknowledging the hype around growth mindset and his own skepticism, Scott argues that the article's critique is not sufficiently robust. He points out that despite the reasons to be suspicious, the growth mindset studies have shown strong results. Scott identifies three main criticisms in the Buzzfeed piece but finds them lacking in strength to fully debunk the theory. He emphasizes the importance of thorough, evidence-based criticism rather than relying on intuition or weak arguments. Scott warns against dismissing potentially valid research too quickly, using an analogy to climate change denial tactics. He concludes by calling for more rigorous efforts to disprove growth mindset if it is indeed flawed. Shorter summary