Scott Alexander critiques Tyler Cowen's use of the 'Safe Uncertainty Fallacy' in discussing AI risk, arguing that uncertainty doesn't justify complacency. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques Tyler Cowen's use of the 'Safe Uncertainty Fallacy' in relation to AI risk. This fallacy argues that because a situation is completely uncertain, it will be fine. Scott explains why this reasoning is flawed, using examples like the printing press and alien starships to illustrate his points. He argues that even in uncertain situations, we need to make best guesses and not default to assuming everything will be fine. Scott criticizes Cowen's lack of specific probability estimates and argues that claiming total uncertainty is intellectually dishonest. The post ends with a satirical twist on Cowen's conclusion about society being designed to 'take the plunge' with new technologies. Shorter summary

Ozy argues for diversifying charitable donations, while Scott counters that focusing on the single most efficient charity at any given time is more effective. Longer summary

This post includes two perspectives on charity donation strategies. Ozy argues for diversification in charitable giving, comparing it to stock market investing. They suggest that a society of effective altruists would still support various charities due to uncertainty and the balance between high-risk/high-return and low-risk/low-return options. Scott disagrees, arguing that charity differs from stock investments due to the absence of diminishing returns in lives saved. He introduces concepts of disaster aversion and low-hanging fruit, concluding that at any given time, there is one most efficient charity to donate to based on current funding levels and marginal utility. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends Bayesianism as a valuable epistemology, contrasting it with absolutist and nihilistic approaches, and argues for its usefulness in complex reasoning. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to David Chapman's criticism of 'Bayesianism' as a philosophy. He argues that Bayesianism is a genuine and valuable epistemology, contrasting it with two other approaches: Aristotelianism (which deals in absolutes) and Anton-Wilsonism (which advocates not believing anything). Scott posits that Bayesianism, or 'Epistemology X', is a synthesis of these, allowing for degrees of belief and updating based on evidence. He defends this view by sharing personal experiences and observations, arguing that while people may not always think in probabilities, having a coherent philosophical foundation like Bayesianism is valuable when dealing with complex issues outside one's comfort zone. Shorter summary