Scott Alexander analyzes the surprisingly low existential risk estimates from a recent forecasting tournament, particularly for AI risk, and explains why he only partially updates his own higher estimates. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the Existential Risk Persuasion Tournament (XPT), which aimed to estimate risks of global catastrophes using experts and superforecasters. The results showed unexpectedly low probabilities for existential risks, particularly for AI. Scott examines possible reasons for these results, including incentive structures, participant expertise, and timing of the study. He ultimately decides to partially update his own estimates, but not fully to the level suggested by the tournament, explaining his reasoning for maintaining some disagreement with the experts. Shorter summary

Scott clarifies his stance on conspiracy theories and expert trust, advocating for a nuanced approach that acknowledges both the value of expert opinion and the potential for misrepresentation. Longer summary

Scott revisits his previous post on fideism, addressing criticism and clarifying his stance on conspiracy theories and trusting experts. He presents three perspectives on conspiracy theories: Idiocy, Intellect, and Infohazard, and argues for a nuanced approach. Scott emphasizes that conspiracy theories can be convincing even to smart people, and that completely avoiding discussion of them is not always effective. He stresses the importance of trusting experts while also being aware of potential biases and misrepresentations. The post concludes with detailed advice on how to approach conspiracy theories and maintain a balanced perspective. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the use of absurdity arguments, reflecting on his critique of Neom and offering strategies to balance absurdity heuristics with careful reasoning. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reflects on his previous post mocking the Neom project, considering whether his use of the absurdity heuristic was justified. He explores the challenges of relying on absurdity arguments, acknowledging that everything ultimately bottoms out in such arguments. The post discusses when it's appropriate to use absurdity heuristics in communication and personal reasoning, and offers strategies for avoiding absurdity bias. These include calibration training, social epistemology, occasional deep dives into fact-checking, and examining why beliefs come to our attention. Scott concludes that while there's no perfect solution, these approaches can help balance the use of absurdity arguments with more rigorous thinking. Shorter summary

This collaboration examines the empirical evidence and significance of spiritual experiences, arguing they deserve serious consideration as an important aspect of human life. Longer summary

This adversarial collaboration explores the significance of spiritual experiences as empirical evidence for a transcendent reality. The authors review psychological research, epistemological arguments, near-death experiences, and entheogen use, discussing how to interpret such experiences and their impact on individuals. While not reaching a definitive conclusion on the metaphysical reality of spiritual experiences, they argue these experiences deserve serious consideration as an important aspect of human life worthy of further exploration. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents a series of nested dialogues exploring the nature of understanding and meaning, from AI to humans to angels to God, questioning what true understanding entails. Longer summary

This post is a philosophical exploration of the nature of understanding and meaning, presented through a series of nested dialogues. It starts with two children discussing an AI's understanding of water, moves to chemists debating the children's understanding, then to angels contemplating human understanding, and finally to God observing it all. Each level reveals a deeper layer of understanding, while simultaneously highlighting the limitations of the previous level. The post uses these dialogues to question what it truly means to understand something, and whether any level of understanding can be considered complete or meaningful. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents a 'Grand Unified Chart' showing how different domains of knowledge share a similar structure in interpreting the world, arguing this is due to basic brain algorithms and effective epistemology. Longer summary

Scott Alexander draws parallels between different domains of knowledge, showing how they all share a similar structure in interpreting the world. He presents a 'Grand Unified Chart' that compares Philosophy of Science, Bayesian Probability, Psychology, Discourse, Society, and Neuroscience. Each domain is broken down into three components: pre-existing ideas, discrepancies, and actual experiences. Scott argues that this structure is universal because it's built into basic brain algorithms and is the most effective way to do epistemology. He emphasizes that the interaction between facts and theories is bidirectional, and that theory change is a complex process resistant to simple contradictions. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explains postmodernism to rationalists, using the Dark Age debate as an example, and discusses its applications, risks, and critiques. Longer summary

Scott Alexander attempts to explain postmodernism to rationalists, using the debate about the existence of a European Dark Age as an example. He describes postmodernism as focusing on how politically-motivated people weave facts to tell specific stories, rather than on the facts themselves. The post discusses how this applies to various fields and how everyone uses postmodernist thinking sometimes. Scott also explores the potential risks of postmodernism collapsing into ignoring disagreeable facts and addresses critiques of the philosophy. He concludes by comparing rationalist and postmodernist approaches to dealing with subjectivity and bias. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the concept of 'Kolmogorov complicity' and its implications for scientific inquiry under oppressive orthodoxies, using historical and hypothetical examples. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'Kolmogorov complicity' in relation to historical and contemporary scientific orthodoxies. He begins by examining myths about scientists persecuted by the Church, noting that while some scientists were indeed punished, it was often for reasons beyond their scientific work. The post then discusses the 'Kolmogorov option,' where scientists strategically comply with political demands while privately pursuing truth. Alexander argues that this approach, while sometimes necessary, can lead to systemic problems in truth-seeking and education. He uses a hypothetical scenario about lightning and thunder to illustrate how even a seemingly harmless orthodoxy can corrupt scientific inquiry and societal knowledge. The post concludes by suggesting the need for 'whisper networks' to maintain truth-seeking in the face of problematic orthodoxies, while acknowledging the challenges and risks involved in such an approach. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents satirical, absurdist 'hardball' questions for presidential candidates, blending their backgrounds with outlandish scenarios and philosophical puzzles. Longer summary

Scott Alexander proposes a series of humorous and satirical 'hardball' questions for presidential candidates in a debate format. He crafts elaborate, absurd scenarios for each candidate based on their background or public statements. For Dr. Carson, he questions the ethics of functional hemispherectomy. For Fiorina, he critiques her praise of the Ottoman Empire. For Bush, he uses statistics to question political dynasties. For Cruz, he explores the paradox of trusting a skilled debater. For Rubio, he spins a conspiracy theory about a magical sword. For Trump, he pokes fun at his branding habits. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores five unspoken assumptions in discussions that can lead to misunderstandings and logical fallacies when not clarified. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses five unspoken ground assumptions in discussions that can lead to misunderstandings and logical fallacies. These include: (1) whether one is presenting a balanced view or arguing for one side, (2) if the argument is literal or pointing towards a hard-to-explain concept, (3) whether describing real-world phenomena or underlying mechanisms, (4) if addressing a specific problem or contributing to a broader intellectual discussion, and (5) whether presenting a definite theory or a hypothesis for consideration. He argues that ambiguity in these grounds can lead to confusion and false accusations of logical fallacies. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends Bayesianism as a valuable epistemology, contrasting it with absolutist and nihilistic approaches, and argues for its usefulness in complex reasoning. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to David Chapman's criticism of 'Bayesianism' as a philosophy. He argues that Bayesianism is a genuine and valuable epistemology, contrasting it with two other approaches: Aristotelianism (which deals in absolutes) and Anton-Wilsonism (which advocates not believing anything). Scott posits that Bayesianism, or 'Epistemology X', is a synthesis of these, allowing for degrees of belief and updating based on evidence. He defends this view by sharing personal experiences and observations, arguing that while people may not always think in probabilities, having a coherent philosophical foundation like Bayesianism is valuable when dealing with complex issues outside one's comfort zone. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends logical positivism, arguing that despite its flaws, it points to useful ideas about dividing meaningful statements into scientific and logical categories. Longer summary

Scott Alexander presents a defense of logical positivism, a philosophical stance generally considered outdated. He argues that while logical positivism may not be entirely correct, it points to a cluster of correct ideas. The post draws parallels between logical positivism, Hume's fork, and modern rationalist thinking, suggesting they all divide meaningful statements into something like science and something like logic. Scott argues this division is productive and helps identify meaningless statements. He then attempts to apply this framework to traditionally challenging areas like mathematics, morality, and counterfactuals. The post concludes by addressing the common criticism that logical positivism fails its own criteria, suggesting that its value might lie in its ability to facilitate productive debate. Shorter summary