Scott Alexander analyzes the surprisingly low existential risk estimates from a recent forecasting tournament, particularly for AI risk, and explains why he only partially updates his own higher estimates. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the Existential Risk Persuasion Tournament (XPT), which aimed to estimate risks of global catastrophes using experts and superforecasters. The results showed unexpectedly low probabilities for existential risks, particularly for AI. Scott examines possible reasons for these results, including incentive structures, participant expertise, and timing of the study. He ultimately decides to partially update his own estimates, but not fully to the level suggested by the tournament, explaining his reasoning for maintaining some disagreement with the experts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends Less Wrong and Eliezer Yudkowsky against accusations of being anti-scientific, arguing that developing rational thinking skills beyond traditional scientific methods is valuable and necessary. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Topher Hallquist's criticism of Less Wrong and Eliezer Yudkowsky as being 'anti-scientific rationality'. Scott argues that Hallquist's criticisms are often unfair or inaccurate, taking quotes out of context or misunderstanding Yudkowsky's positions. He defends the rationalist community's efforts to develop better thinking tools that go beyond traditional scientific methods, while still respecting science. Scott contends that developing an 'Art of Thinking Clearly' is valuable and necessary, especially for experts who have to make difficult judgments. He argues Less Wrong is not against science, but wants to strengthen and supplement it with additional rational thinking skills. Shorter summary