Scott Alexander responds to comments on his post about criticism of EA, addressing various points about scientific paradigms, types of criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his previous post about criticism of EA. He addresses various points raised by commenters, including discussions about the nature of paradigm shifts in science, the value of specific vs. general criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Scott clarifies that he wasn't arguing EA only wants non-threatening criticism, but rather that some organizations genuinely want to improve. He also reflects on the challenges of distinguishing between expressing opinions and evangelizing, especially for philosophies that make unusual moral demands. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that despite some replication failures, the core of behavioral economics remains valid and valuable, with the field continuing to evolve and refine its understanding of human decision-making. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Jason Hreha's article claiming the 'death of behavioral economics'. He argues that while some studies have failed to replicate, the core insights of behavioral economics remain valid. Scott examines the historical origins of loss aversion, discusses recent debates about its existence, and argues that even small effect sizes can be valuable at scale. He concludes that behavioral economics as a field is generally healthy, continuing to investigate and refine our understanding of human decision-making, though specific paradigms may evolve over time. Shorter summary

Scott reviews Kuhn's 'Structure of Scientific Revolutions', finding its thesis on paradigm shifts in science intriguing but frustratingly vague, especially beyond physics. Longer summary

Scott reviews Thomas Kuhn's 'The Structure of Scientific Revolutions', which argues that science progresses through paradigm shifts rather than simple accumulation of facts. Kuhn posits that scientific paradigms are comprehensive worldviews that guide research and interpretation of data. When anomalies accumulate, a new paradigm may emerge to replace the old one. Scott finds Kuhn's thesis intriguing but frustratingly vague in parts, especially in applying it beyond physics. He draws connections between Kuhn's ideas and predictive coding in neuroscience, suggesting both describe how pre-existing mental structures shape perception and understanding. Overall, Scott sees value in Kuhn's perspective but wishes for more clarity and examples from other scientific fields. Shorter summary