Scott Alexander methodically rebuts Steven Pinker's arguments against AI risk concerns and documents fifteen years of what he considers misrepresentations and bad-faith arguments from Pinker about the AI safety community.

Scott Alexander discusses the dangers of relying on 'Heuristics That Almost Always Work' through various examples, highlighting their limitations and potential consequences.

Scott Alexander argues that the media's failure in coronavirus coverage was not about prediction, but about poor probabilistic reasoning and decision-making under uncertainty.

Scott Alexander examines and expresses skepticism about a theory that attributes high-dose melatonin supplements to patent avoidance, while reflecting on the challenges of evaluating such claims.

Scott analyzes a new survey of AI researchers, showing diverse opinions on AI timelines and risks, with many acknowledging potential dangers but few prioritizing safety research.

Scott analyzes when assertions should be trusted, showing that their evidentiary value depends on whether you already know the belief's distribution, the asserter's credentials, and how you encountered them, while claims of having 'evidence' mostly serve as signals of rationality rather than factual proof.