Scott Alexander examines Matt Yglesias's public predictions and discusses the implications for evaluating pundits and the future of prediction-based journalism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses Matt Yglesias's recent foray into making public predictions, a practice uncommon among pundits. He compares Yglesias's predictions to those on Metaculus and reflects on the broader implications for journalism and punditry. Scott explores the challenges of fairly evaluating pundits based on predictions, the artificiality of predetermined prediction sets, and the disconnect between prediction accuracy and valuable commentary. He suggests that pundits should make predictions directly related to their claims and proposes using prediction markets as a benchmark for pundit performance. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues against harshly criticizing various groups often mocked by both left and right, emphasizing nuanced thinking and engagement with evidence. Longer summary

Scott Alexander argues against dismissing or mocking several groups often criticized by both left and right-wing commentators. He defends celebrities speaking out against Trump, people comparing politics to Harry Potter, Hamilton fans, Vox, Matt Yglesias, pundits who failed to predict Trump's victory, and those concerned about Russian election interference. The post uses a mix of logical arguments, personal anecdotes, and humor to make the case that these groups don't deserve harsh criticism, while also acknowledging some of their flaws. Scott emphasizes the importance of nuanced thinking, avoiding sweeping conclusions from limited data, and engaging with evidence rather than dismissing concerns outright. Shorter summary

A study on expert prediction of behavioral economics experiments finds that experts have only a slight advantage over non-experts, suggesting that a separate 'rationality' skill may be more important than specific expertise. Longer summary

This post discusses a study by DellaVigna & Pope on expert prediction of behavioral economics experiments. The study found that knowledgeable academics had only a slight advantage over random individuals in predicting experimental results. Prestigious academics did not outperform less prestigious ones, and field of expertise did not matter. The expert advantage was small and easily overwhelmed by wisdom of crowds effects. The author suggests that these results indicate that experts' expertise may not be helping them much in this context, and proposes that a separate 'rationality' skill, somewhat predicted by high IQ and scientific training but not identical to either, might explain the results. The post also discusses the implications of these findings for real-world issues like election predictions, noting important caveats about the nature of the predictive task in the study. Shorter summary