Scott argues against the concept of "telescopic altruism" - the claim that liberals care more about distant strangers than nearby people - showing that people who care about faraway causes also care about nearby ones, and that compassion is generally correlated across all distances rather than inversely related. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques the concept of "telescopic altruism," which claims that some people (usually liberals) ignore those close to them to care about distant strangers. He argues this accusation collapses under scrutiny: people who care about 50,000 deaths in Gaza would also care about 50,000 deaths among their neighbors. He debunks a commonly cited study whose heatmap visualization is misinterpreted to suggest liberals care more about rocks than family, when it actually just shows the outer limit of their moral concern. Scott proposes instead a "correlated altruism" hypothesis, citing Dave Barry's principle that someone nice to waiters is genuinely nice. He provides evidence that liberals who support foreign aid also support domestic programs like school lunches and COVID measures, and shows statistics suggesting liberals aren't worse at maintaining family relationships. The post concludes by acknowledging that some people do neglect their communities, but argues this happens because they care too much and are incompetent, not because they don't care at all. Shorter summary

Scott critiques self-proclaimed moral nihilists who claim to not care about strangers' suffering, by pointing out their passionate response to the British grooming gangs scandal reveals they actually do care. Longer summary

Scott points out that self-proclaimed 'based post-Christian vitalists' who claim to reject caring about suffering of strangers in far-off countries, suddenly become very passionate about the British grooming gangs scandal. He argues this reveals their true moral nature - that like everyone else, they do have basic moral impulses that include caring about suffering of strangers. The post examines different ways people try to reconcile their contradictory moral impulses, and argues that admitting to having moral concern for others is more honest than trying to maintain a facade of not caring. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that altruism and vitalism mostly align in practice, and that focusing on their theoretical divergences often stems from signaling rather than genuine pursuit of societal improvement. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to critiques of his understanding of the Nietzschean objection to altruism, particularly the idea that vitalism (maximizing life, glory, and strength) is superior. He argues that in most normal cases, altruism and vitalism suggest the same solutions, and their apparent divergence only occurs in extreme, unrealistic scenarios. Scott suggests that both philosophies, when taken to extremes, lead to absurd outcomes. He expresses suspicion towards those who focus too much on the divergence between altruism and vitalism in normal cases, arguing that such focus often stems from a desire to signal toughness rather than genuinely pursuing societal strength. The post concludes by challenging vitalists to 'pretend to really try' in implementing their philosophy, suggesting that this would likely lead to outcomes similar to those pursued by altruists. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander's poem, inspired by a tragic aid airdrop incident in Gaza, explores the challenges and unintended consequences of altruism through various philosophical lenses. Longer summary

Scott Alexander presents a poetic reflection on the challenges and unintended consequences of trying to help others, inspired by a tragic incident where an aid airdrop killed five people in Gaza. The poem explores various philosophical approaches to altruism and social responsibility, ultimately settling on a utilitarian perspective while acknowledging its limitations. The verses touch on historical figures, personal growth, and the complexities of moral decision-making in a world where good intentions can lead to harmful outcomes. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander summarizes and responds to various comments on his kidney donation post, covering a wide range of related topics and perspectives. Longer summary

Scott Alexander provides highlights from comments on his kidney donation post, covering various perspectives and topics. These include comments from other kidney donors and recipients, discussions on opt-out organ donation systems, debates on radiation risk from screening tests, issues with rejection during the donation process, polls about willingness to donate, and developments in artificial organ technology. Scott also responds to many comments, offering additional insights and reflections on the donation process and related ethical considerations. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander recounts his experience donating a kidney, from initial motivation to post-surgery recovery, while discussing the broader context of organ donation. Longer summary

Scott Alexander describes his journey to donate a kidney, including his motivations, the medical process, and the challenges he faced. He discusses the effectiveness of kidney donation compared to other forms of altruism, the stigma around mental health in the donation process, and the need for systemic changes to address the kidney shortage. Scott also reflects on the experience of the surgery and recovery, and encourages others to consider donation. Shorter summary

Scott examines why the rich appear to influence politics despite theoretical barriers, proposing that moral philosophies may emerge to solve wealthy coordination problems. Longer summary

This post explores the paradox of how the rich seem to influence politics despite the free-rider problem that should theoretically prevent such coordination. Scott starts by explaining why it's not in an individual rich person's self-interest to donate to political causes, even if the outcome would benefit them. He then proposes two possible explanations: either the rich influence politics through 'soft power', or they participate due to sincere moral beliefs that happen to align with their financial interests. The latter explanation leads to a fascinating hypothesis about how moral philosophies might 'spring up' to solve coordination problems among the wealthy. Scott concludes by noting the implications of this idea, including its potential application to other conspiracy theories and why the poor don't seem to coordinate as effectively. Shorter summary