Scott Alexander refutes Freddie deBoer's argument against expecting major events in our lifetimes, presenting a more nuanced approach to estimating such probabilities. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Freddie deBoer's argument against expecting significant events like a singularity or apocalypse in our lifetimes. Alexander critiques deBoer's 'temporal Copernican principle,' arguing that it fails basic sanity checks and misunderstands anthropic reasoning. He presents a more nuanced approach to estimating probabilities of major events, considering factors like technological progress and population distribution. Alexander concludes that while prior probabilities for significant events in one's lifetime are not negligible, they should be updated based on observations and common sense. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends using probabilities for hard-to-model events, arguing they aid clear communication and decision-making even in uncertain domains. Longer summary

Scott Alexander defends the use of non-frequentist probabilities for hard-to-model, non-repeating events. He argues that probabilities are linguistically convenient, don't necessarily describe one's level of information, and can be valuable when provided by expert forecasters. Scott counters claims that probabilities are used as a substitute for reasoning and addresses objections about applying probabilities to complex topics like AI. He emphasizes that probabilities are useful tools for clear communication and decision-making, even in uncertain domains. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander analyzes results from a 2022 prediction contest, discussing top performers and methods for improving forecast accuracy. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews the results of a 2022 prediction contest where 508 participants assigned probabilities to 71 yes-or-no questions about future events. The post discusses the performance of individual forecasters, aggregation methods, and prediction markets. It highlights the success of superforecasters, the wisdom of crowds, and prediction markets. The article also announces winners, discusses demographic factors in forecasting ability, and introduces a new contest for 2023, emphasizing the potential for improving forecasting accuracy through various methods. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the concept of 'Pascalian Medicine', weighing the pros and cons of taking multiple unproven but potentially beneficial treatments. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'Pascalian Medicine', where one takes multiple unproven but safe treatments based on a small chance they might work. He discusses this in the context of COVID-19 treatments like Vitamin D and ivermectin, and extends it to other conditions. The post examines arguments for and against this approach, including safety concerns, societal impacts, and the risk of being exploited by bad actors. Scott concludes that while this strategy might work for individuals, it's problematic on a societal level, and reconciling inside and outside views on the probability of treatments working remains challenging. Shorter summary

Scott reviews 'The Black Swan' by Nassim Taleb, examining its key concepts and Taleb's unique perspective on probability and risk. Longer summary

Scott reviews Nassim Nicholas Taleb's book 'The Black Swan', which explores the impact of rare and unpredictable events. He discusses Taleb's key concepts like the ludic fallacy and Platonicity, compares the book to other works on rationality, and reflects on Taleb's unique style and perspective. Scott also examines Taleb's critique of 'nerds' and his emphasis on empiricism over theory, while noting some potential issues with an overly empirical approach. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews a paper that claims to solve the Fermi Paradox by using probability distributions instead of point estimates in Drake Equation calculations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses a paper by Sandberg, Drexler, and Ord that claims to dissolve the Fermi Paradox. The authors argue that the traditional Drake Equation approach, which multiplies point estimates of various factors, is flawed. Instead, they propose using a distribution of probabilities for each factor. Using this method, they calculate a much higher probability (about 1 in 3) of Earth being alone in the galaxy, compared to the vanishingly small probability from the traditional approach. Scott expresses surprise that this approach wasn't widely used before, given its apparent simplicity and effectiveness. He also highlights an interesting section from the paper's supplement discussing potential barriers to complex life arising from alternative genetic systems. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues for the use of probabilities in decision-making even without well-defined models, using examples to show why this approach is necessary and beneficial in real-world situations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander argues against the idea that probabilities should not be used without well-defined models. He presents scenarios where probability judgments are necessary even in novel situations, such as alien contact or evaluating research proposals. The post discusses the importance of making probability estimates in real-world decisions, even when precise models are unavailable. Scott acknowledges some valid criticisms but ultimately argues that using probabilities allows for better decision-making, accuracy checking, and challenging overconfidence. He suggests that alternatives to probabilistic thinking fall short when faced with real-world choices. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses the problem of overconfidence in probability estimates, arguing that extreme certainty is rarely justified, especially for complex future predictions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the problem of overconfidence in probability estimates, particularly when people claim to be extremely certain about complex future events. He explains how experiments show that people are often vastly overconfident, even when they claim 99.9999% certainty. Scott argues that extreme confidence is rarely justified, especially for predictions about technological progress or societal changes. He suggests that overconfidence contributes to intolerance and close-mindedness, and that studying history can help reduce overconfidence by showing how often confident predictions have been wrong in the past. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander critiques Dylan Matthews' argument against prioritizing existential risk reduction, arguing that Matthews misuses probabilities and that his logic could also undermine other effective altruist causes. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques Dylan Matthews' argument against prioritizing existential risk reduction in effective altruism. Matthews claims that the probabilities used in x-risk arguments are made up and could be as low as 10^-66. Scott argues that such extremely low probabilities are unrealistic and that Matthews is misusing numbers. He explains that even with rough estimates, the case for prioritizing x-risk remains strong. Scott also points out that similar arguments could be used against other causes Matthews supports, like animal welfare. He concludes by advocating for a big tent approach in effective altruism that respects different cause prioritizations, including x-risk, while acknowledging that x-risk might not be the best public face for the movement. Shorter summary