Scott Alexander surveys people's preferences between suffering and oblivion, finding split opinions and weak correlations between different scenarios and real-world beliefs.

Scott Alexander defends Less Wrong and Eliezer Yudkowsky against accusations of being anti-scientific, arguing that developing rational thinking skills beyond traditional scientific methods is valuable and necessary.

Scott presents the results of the 2014 Less Wrong survey covering demographics, beliefs, community participation, and various psychological measures from 1503 respondents.

Scott uses Less Wrong survey data to show that experienced rationalists are actually less likely than newcomers to believe cryonics will work, yet more likely to sign up for it, demonstrating that rationalist training teaches people to act on beliefs rather than making them more credulous.

Scott argues that if Big World theories are true and we accept the consequentialist view of identity used by cryonics advocates, then perfect copies of you already exist throughout the multiverse, making cryonics unnecessary for a form of immortality.

Scott Alexander presents comprehensive results from the 2011 Less Wrong survey of 1090 respondents, covering demographics, beliefs, probability estimates on various topics, and a calibration test that shows the community performs better than average but has some calibration issues.

Scott argues that mental states like beliefs and preferences may not exist as unified entities in the brain, but rather emerge from collections of behaviors and contextual responses.

Scott argues that opportunity costs should be calculated based on what you'll realistically do with resources, not on theoretical optimal alternatives, using examples from cryonics spending, NASA budgets, and charitable giving.

Scott analyzes results from a 166-person Less Wrong survey covering demographics, probability estimates on various topics, and philosophical positions, finding a highly educated, mostly male, atheist, politically libertarian/liberal community with surprisingly accurate collective knowledge but notable gaps between stated beliefs and actions.