Scott Alexander uses thought experiments to explore how people form coalitions and support networks, relating these to real-world social and political dynamics. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores social dynamics through thought experiments involving castaways on a lifeboat and various 'backscratchers clubs'. He discusses how people form coalitions, make decisions in extreme situations, and how ideologies and social movements can serve as covers for mutual support networks. The post examines the formation of in-groups, the role of Schelling points in decision-making, and how these dynamics might relate to real-world phenomena like racism, nationalism, and establishment power structures. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends effective altruism against Freddie deBoer's criticism, arguing for its distinctiveness, practical value, and positive marginal effects. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Freddie deBoer's criticism of effective altruism (EA) as a 'shell game'. He argues that EA can be defined distinctly from universally-held beliefs, serves as a social technology to encourage charitable action, and is composed of valuable organizations. Scott also discusses the challenges of categorizing ideological movements, suggests judging movements by their marginal effects, and defends EA's focus on both widely accepted and more controversial causes. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues against the claim that 'rationality free from ideology doesn't exist', asserting that recognizing irrationality implies the existence of rationality. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques the argument that 'there's no such thing as rationality free from ideology'. He argues that if we can identify people who are especially irrational or biased (like Alex Jones), then we must also be able to recognize those who are more rational or objective. Scott contends that while perfect rationality might be impossible, this doesn't mean we can't strive for improvement. He suggests that claiming the impossibility of true rationality is actually arrogant, as it implies one has reached the limits of what's possible. The post emphasizes the importance of recognizing that some approaches can be more rational than others, and that we should learn from those who are better at rationality rather than dismissing the concept entirely. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander presents a 'Grand Unified Chart' showing how different domains of knowledge share a similar structure in interpreting the world, arguing this is due to basic brain algorithms and effective epistemology. Longer summary

Scott Alexander draws parallels between different domains of knowledge, showing how they all share a similar structure in interpreting the world. He presents a 'Grand Unified Chart' that compares Philosophy of Science, Bayesian Probability, Psychology, Discourse, Society, and Neuroscience. Each domain is broken down into three components: pre-existing ideas, discrepancies, and actual experiences. Scott argues that this structure is universal because it's built into basic brain algorithms and is the most effective way to do epistemology. He emphasizes that the interaction between facts and theories is bidirectional, and that theory change is a complex process resistant to simple contradictions. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines tribalism, arguing that ideologies often serve as 'rallying flags' for tribes rather than defining their core identity. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of tribalism, arguing that ideologies and beliefs often serve as 'rallying flags' for tribes rather than being the core of what defines them. He examines various examples including religious sects, disability communities, and online subcultures to illustrate how tribes form, develop, and sometimes dissolve. The post suggests that understanding groups as tribes with historical context rather than purely ideological entities can provide insight into many social phenomena and conflicts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses how figure/ground illusions in ideological debates can make balanced representation appear biased, using examples from effective altruism and AI risk. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of figure/ground illusions in ideological debates, particularly in the context of effective altruism and AI risk. He argues that when a previously marginalized view gains equal footing with more mainstream perspectives, it can appear dominant due to this illusion. The post uses examples from effective altruism, the blog's comment section, and Scott's own reputation to illustrate how balanced representation can be misperceived as bias. He suggests that this phenomenon might explain why some people view AI risk as dominating effective altruism, despite evidence to the contrary. Shorter summary