Scott travels to Medjugorje, Bosnia to investigate reports of sun miracles, witnesses one himself with his wife, and develops a naturalistic explanation involving afterimages and atmospheric conditions that explains both the Medjugorje and Fatima phenomena. Longer summary

Scott Alexander investigates the sun miracle at Medjugorje, Bosnia, where thousands of pilgrims report seeing the sun spin and change colors. He travels there with his wife, interviews locals, and witnesses a small-scale miracle himself. After analyzing the experience and comparing it to the famous Fatima miracle, he proposes a naturalistic explanation involving afterimages, eye damage, and specific cloud conditions. The post explores eyewitness accounts, the history of Marian apparitions at Medjugorje, and the optical physics behind the phenomenon, ultimately concluding that while impressive, the miracle can be explained through unusual but natural atmospheric conditions combined with prolonged sun-gazing. Shorter summary

Scott explores reader responses to his Fatima miracle post, finding the most promising explanation in Buddhist fire kasina meditation practices that produce similar visual phenomena, while remaining uncertain about how 70,000 untrained people could achieve advanced meditative states instantly. Longer summary

Scott discusses reader responses to his previous post about the Fatima sun miracle, exploring new theories and evidence. The most promising explanation connects the phenomenon to 'fire kasina' meditation, a Buddhist practice of staring at bright lights that produces similar visual effects including spinning, color changes, and complex imagery. He examines the parallel case of Iranians seeing Ayatollah Khomeini's face in the moon in 1978, analyzes various videos of modern sun miracles (concluding they're camera artifacts), interviews a Medjugorje witness, and engages with Ethan Muse's counterarguments about the miracle being an objective phenomenon. Scott also addresses philosophical questions about miracles and Bayesian reasoning, ultimately remaining uncertain but slightly less confused than before, with fire kasina providing the best but still imperfect explanation. Shorter summary

A detailed investigation of the Sun Miracle of Fatima in 1917, where 70,000 people witnessed the sun appear to spin, change colors, and fall to earth, analyzing witness testimonies, skeptical explanations, and similar phenomena at other Marian apparition sites. Longer summary

Scott conducts an extensive investigation into the 1917 Miracle of the Sun at Fatima, where tens of thousands witnessed what appeared to be the sun spinning, changing colors, and falling to earth. He examines approximately 60 primary testimonies, evaluates common skeptical explanations (optical phenomena, weather events, mass hallucination), and documents similar sun miracles at other Marian apparition sites worldwide. Scott then critiques Dalleur's theory about distant witnesses and shadow analysis, explores why more people don't see these phenomena normally, and proposes a tentative materialist explanation involving a rare optical illusion modulated by cloud cover and social priming. The post ends by suggesting research directions for those interested in further investigation. Shorter summary

Scott reviews Steven Byrnes' work explaining how our perception of self and consciousness can flip between different models, similar to optical illusions, which explains phenomena like trance, hypnosis, and spiritual experiences. Longer summary

Scott reviews Steven Byrnes' 2024 series on predictive processing and self-models. The post explains how our perception of both external reality and internal mental states is based on models that can be bistable (flip between two interpretations). Just as optical illusions can flip between two interpretations, our sense of self can flip between different models. This explains phenomena like trance, hypnosis, dissociative disorders, and spiritual experiences. The post details how trance states work through a four-step process of belief, relaxation, suppressing contrary evidence, and gathering supporting evidence, then applies this framework to explain various psychological phenomena including Buddhist enlightenment and Julian Jaynes' theories about ancient consciousness. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander defends the concept of automaticity in psychology, arguing that core cognitive biases and priming effects are real, while acknowledging some claims have been overstated. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to a critique of automaticity in psychology, arguing that while some claims about cognitive biases and priming have been overstated, the core concepts are real and well-replicated. He provides examples of cognitive biases, priming effects, and nudges that have strong evidence behind them. Scott compares cognitive biases to optical illusions - real phenomena that affect our perception, but not in ways that make us completely helpless. He argues that automaticity is actually a very old idea about human nature, found in various philosophical and religious traditions. While we shouldn't see ourselves as completely controlled by unconscious forces, Scott suggests that accepting some level of automaticity in our cognition is both realistic and not necessarily problematic. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores whether people can be honestly mistaken about their own experiences, presenting counterexamples and attempting to reconcile them with the idea that we can't be wrong about our immediate subjective experiences. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the concept of whether people can be honestly wrong about their own experiences. He initially asserts that people can't be wrong about their own experience, only lying or telling the truth. However, he then explores several counterexamples and edge cases that challenge this view. These include instances of hunger not being consciously felt, time perception on drugs, a woman claiming to be enlightened but unaware of her thoughts, optical illusions, and psychedelic experiences. Scott attempts to reconcile these examples with his initial assertion by differentiating between subjective experiences and underlying realities. He concludes by acknowledging the difficulty in maintaining his original position, while still feeling that there's something fundamentally true about the idea that we can't be wrong about our immediate experiences. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reports on weak correlations and inconclusive results from the latest SSC survey on optical illusions and visual perception. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the results of the latest SSC survey, focusing on optical illusions and visual riddles. He admits to being unable to expand on or strengthen his previous findings from 'Why Are Transgender People Immune To Optical Illusions' and 'Can We Link Perception And Cognition?'. While he weakly replicated some previous results, the correlations were too low to be exciting. He found minimal internal structure in the results, with different versions of the same illusion showing low correlation. The post also briefly mentions some pre-registered investigations that yielded uninteresting or negative results, including studies on political conflict theory, autism and categorization responses, and ADHD and ambition. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander preregisters hypotheses for the 2018 SSC Survey, planning to explore relationships between perception, cognition, personality, and demographics. Longer summary

Scott Alexander preregisters his hypotheses for the 2018 SSC Survey. He plans to investigate various relationships between perception, cognition, personality traits, and demographic factors. Key areas of focus include replicating previous findings on perception and cognition, exploring concepts like 'first sight and second thoughts' and 'ambiguity tolerance', investigating birth order effects, and examining correlations with autism, political views, and sexual harassment. He also plans to follow up on a previous AI risk persuasion experiment. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores potential links between perception of optical illusions and cognitive styles, proposing further research to investigate these connections. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the potential link between perception and cognition based on survey results about optical illusions. He notes that 'weirder' groups (e.g., schizophrenics, transhumanists, polyamorous people) tend to see more ambiguity in illusions like the Hollow Mask and Spinning Dancer. Scott proposes a research program to explore whether perception of optical illusions could predict cognitive biases or high-level beliefs. He plans to include more illusions in future surveys to better understand the underlying mental processes. While acknowledging the ambitiousness of this idea, he cites some supporting evidence, such as the involvement of NMDA receptors in both political opinions and illusion perception. Scott also considers potential confounding factors and how to address them in future research. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander hypothesizes a link between transgender identity, optical illusions, and NMDA receptor function, based on survey data and existing research on schizophrenia and autism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores a potential link between transgender identity, optical illusions, and NMDA receptor function in the brain. He presents survey data suggesting that transgender individuals, like those with schizophrenia and autism, are less susceptible to certain optical illusions. He hypothesizes that this might be related to NMDA receptor hypofunction, which is also associated with dissociation, a common experience among transgender people. The post explores how estrogen, which enhances NMDA function, alleviates dissociation in trans women. Scott connects these findings to broader research on NMDA receptors in schizophrenia and autism, noting the higher prevalence of these conditions in transgender populations. The post concludes with several caveats and suggestions for future research to validate these speculative connections. Shorter summary

The post examines Midwestern geography, debunking the author's initial impression of a grid pattern in town arrangements and humorously exploring potential 'ley lines' between cities. Longer summary

This post explores the geography of the Midwest, particularly Ohio, Indiana, Iowa, and Minnesota, using satellite images. The author initially thought there was a clear grid pattern in the arrangement of towns, but upon closer inspection, found this to be an illusion. The post discusses the Public Land Survey System, which does create a grid pattern, but at a smaller scale than what's visible on these maps. The author humorously looks for 'ley lines' connecting cities and finds a few potential alignments, though these are likely coincidental. The post concludes with an anecdote about Zilwaukee, Michigan, supposedly named to trick settlers heading to Milwaukee into settling there instead. Shorter summary