Scott analyzes why people support government-funded foreign aid instead of donating voluntarily, examining and critiquing several theories including virtue signaling, coordination problems, and time-inconsistent preferences. Longer summary

Scott examines why people support government-funded foreign aid rather than just donating directly, pushing back against the 'other people's money' argument. He considers and critiques several explanations: the force multiplier theory (seizing opponents' money), virtue signaling through voting, psychological free-riding on knowing problems are solved, coordination problems requiring bundling, transaction costs that make voluntary systems impractical, and time-inconsistent preferences where people's long-term values differ from their moment-to-moment impulses. Scott concludes by proposing a thought experiment where tax forms include an opt-out box for foreign aid, predicting most people wouldn't use it, suggesting the issue is more complex than simply wanting to spend others' money. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander responds to Tyler Cowen about USAID funding, correcting his own previous claims about overhead costs while maintaining that Cowen's criticism of USAID was misleading and potentially harmful. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to Tyler Cowen's criticism of his previous post about USAID funding. He addresses several points: whether Cowen endorsed Rubio's claims about USAID waste, the true nature of overhead costs in USAID-funded organizations, and the broader debate about foreign aid effectiveness. Scott shows that actual administrative overhead in major USAID partners like Catholic Relief Services is much lower than previously thought (around 6-7% rather than 30%), admits his mistake on this point, but maintains his criticism of Cowen's original post as misleading. He argues that USAID's work is predominantly focused on essential humanitarian aid rather than wasteful programs. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander criticizes Tyler Cowen and others for misrepresenting USAID's funding model, explaining how regranting through other charities is both necessary and effective despite seeming inefficient to outsiders. Longer summary

Scott Alexander criticizes a Marginal Revolution post by Tyler Cowen about USAID funding, where Cowen suggests that only 12% of funds go to recipients. Scott explains that this is misleading because USAID is not a direct charity but a funding organization that works through other charities. He details how the grant-making process works, defends the overhead costs, and points out that Cowen himself runs an organization (Mercatus Center) that does similar regranting. Scott particularly criticizes Trump and Rubio for misrepresenting these programs as wasteful, noting that programs like PEPFAR have saved millions of lives and have very low rates of unexplained expenses. Shorter summary

Scott argues that debates about prioritizing Americans over foreigners in the PEPFAR controversy miss the point, as cancelled foreign aid money wouldn't automatically fund effective domestic programs but would instead be spent much less efficiently. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques recent discussions about PEPFAR, a successful AIDS program in Africa that was briefly paused. He argues that debates about whether we should prioritize Americans over foreigners miss the key point: money saved from canceling highly effective programs like PEPFAR wouldn't automatically go to equally effective domestic programs. Instead, it would likely fund much less effective initiatives or get lost in general federal spending. The post explains how government spending tends to be inefficient, and argues that even if you value American lives more than foreign ones, the effectiveness gap between PEPFAR and likely alternative uses of the money is so large (around 100x) that you would need to value foreign lives at literally zero to justify canceling it. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander's poem, inspired by a tragic aid airdrop incident in Gaza, explores the challenges and unintended consequences of altruism through various philosophical lenses. Longer summary

Scott Alexander presents a poetic reflection on the challenges and unintended consequences of trying to help others, inspired by a tragic incident where an aid airdrop killed five people in Gaza. The poem explores various philosophical approaches to altruism and social responsibility, ultimately settling on a utilitarian perspective while acknowledging its limitations. The verses touch on historical figures, personal growth, and the complexities of moral decision-making in a world where good intentions can lead to harmful outcomes. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that fundamental value differences are less common and less aligned with political tribes than often assumed, emphasizing the need for coexistence despite varying values. Longer summary

Scott Alexander challenges the idea that fundamental value differences are a significant barrier to cooperation. He argues that many apparent value differences are actually factual disagreements or inconsistently applied principles. Using examples like foreign aid and immigration, he shows how people's values often shift based on context and convenience. Alexander suggests that while some fundamental value differences may exist, they don't necessarily align with political or cultural tribes. He concludes that since everyone has some value differences with everyone else, learning to coexist despite these differences is crucial. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that military interventions can potentially be a cost-effective way to help foreigners, contrary to a Slate article's claim. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques a Slate article arguing that military interventions are an expensive way to help foreigners. He argues that comparing interventions to GiveWell's top charities is flawed reasoning, and presents a cost-effectiveness analysis of the 2011 Libya intervention. Using quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) as a metric, he calculates that the Libya intervention cost about $65 per QALY, which is slightly more cost-effective than donations to the Against Malaria Foundation at $75 per QALY. Scott emphasizes that both figures are extremely low compared to typical healthcare interventions. He concludes that military interventions can potentially be very cost-effective for humanitarian goals, though they come with risks and unpredictable consequences. Shorter summary