Scott examines why early Christianity's strategy of unconditional cooperation succeeded despite game theory predicting it should fail, and explores what this means for modern moral strategies.

Scott Alexander uses thought experiments to explore how people form coalitions and support networks, relating these to real-world social and political dynamics.

Scott reviews a biography of John von Neumann, exploring the mathematician's life, genius, and views on existential risk from technology.

The review analyzes Robert Ellickson's 'Order Without Law', which argues that close-knit communities often develop welfare-maximizing social norms that supersede formal laws.

Scott Alexander presents the results of the 2020 Slate Star Codex survey, including links to data, privacy measures, and future analysis plans.

In a fictional story, five islanders confront their society's religious taboos after a shipwrecked sailor points out their blue eyes, leading them to question and ultimately reject their beliefs.

Scott Alexander argues that the right to waive one's rights can be beneficial, using examples from psychiatry and game theory to illustrate his point.

Scott Alexander explores how perfect predictions of war outcomes, through oracles or prediction markets, could potentially prevent wars, and extends this concept to conflicts between superintelligent AIs.

Scott Alexander reviews Singer's book on Marx, finding Marx's ideas deeply flawed, particularly his refusal to plan for communist governance and his belief in infinitely malleable human nature.

Scott Alexander examines contractualism and its limitations using a thought experiment of 100 men with varying strengths, exploring how power dynamics affect moral agreements.

Scott explores the concept of an 'Economists' Paradise' to derive a form of contractualism as a basis for morality, potentially grounding utilitarianism and resolving some of its paradoxes.

Scott Alexander analyzes Moloch as a metaphor for destructive societal coordination problems, using various examples to show how competing incentives can lead to negative outcomes.

Scott Alexander humorously explores the World Cup's complex rules, game theory in soccer, and unusual incentive structures in international tournaments.

Scott Alexander argues against using dishonest and harmful tactics in pursuit of social or political goals, defending the power of truthfulness, kindness, and liberalism.

Scott presents six game theory scenarios demonstrating how strategic thinking can force rational actors into seemingly irrational outcomes, ranging from theoretical examples like evil plutocrats and hostile takeovers to real-world applications like dollar auctions and the Golden Balls game show.

Scott explains why no perfect voting system exists, using examples to show how different voting procedures lead to different outcomes, and discusses mathematical proofs demonstrating that all reasonable voting systems must allow some tactical voting.

Scott explains the economics of bargaining and auctions, showing how prices emerge from negotiations between buyers and sellers when both parties lack perfect information about supply and demand.

Scott defines signaling and explains how it works through examples ranging from college degrees to diamond necklaces, emphasizing both its necessity for conveying credible information and its potential for wasteful resource destruction.

Scott examines experimental data on how people actually behave in Prisoner's Dilemma and Ultimatum Game situations, finding that people use various heuristics like tit-for-tat and fairness considerations rather than purely rational strategies.

Scott explains how real-world solutions to Prisoner's Dilemmas work through social institutions, reputation systems, and evolved emotions like friendship and anger.

Scott introduces the Prisoners' Dilemma, showing how rational reasoning leads two criminals to defect against each other even when mutual cooperation would benefit both, then explores why iterating the dilemma doesn't fully solve the problem.

Scott explains backward reasoning in game theory through decision trees, culminating in a counterintuitive example where giving the US president line-item veto power could actually reduce the president's ability to achieve desired outcomes.

Scott explains Nash equilibria (outcomes where no player regrets their strategy given the other's choice) and Schelling points (focal points that help coordinate between multiple equilibria), using examples ranging from meeting a partner to military strategy to show how these game theory concepts apply to real-world coordination problems.

Scott introduces a 10-post sequence on game theory fundamentals, drawing from 'The Art of Strategy' by Dixit and Nalebuff, with links to all planned posts.

Scott proposes that guilt evolved as a costly signal to prove trustworthiness to potential cooperation partners, explaining why guilt involves public self-punishment and can even occur when someone hasn't done anything wrong.