Scott explores what constitutes a deontological bar (hard moral rule) by examining when consequentialist reasoning should be constrained, using debates within AI safety about working with AI companies versus pursuing regulation as his main examples. Longer summary

Scott examines the concept of deontological bars - hard moral rules that shouldn't be broken even for good consequences - and tries to develop a framework for determining what counts as such a rule. He starts with the classic example of not assassinating leaders, then explores various formulations like 'act as if your maxim would become a general law' and 'don't defect from functioning norms,' testing them against cases like military disarmament and spreading misinformation. The post is motivated by debates in AI safety between those working with AI companies and those pursuing pause/ban regulations, with each side suspecting the other might be violating deontological bars. Scott proposes that the rule might be 'don't do something which would be bad if universalized, unless the norm is non-functioning in such a way that you'd be playing cooperate while your enemy plays defect,' though he acknowledges this requires interpretive work and common sense to apply. Shorter summary

Scott creates a philosophical fiction where multiple characters named John Rawls explore the veil of ignorance through a drug that simulates living other people's lives, spiraling through nested realities until ending with a disturbing twist about karma and moral desert. Longer summary

This is a complex philosophical fiction exploring John Rawls' veil of ignorance concept through multiple characters all named John Rawls. The story follows John Rawls the Alcoholic through multiple layers of reality, starting with his rejection by a charity called the John Rawls Foundation that uses a drug to test whether poor people would help the rich if positions were reversed. The narrative spirals through nested drug-induced dreams, featuring encounters with a banker, a visionary, and eventually Brahma himself, who explains karma and reincarnation as mechanisms enforcing the golden rule. The story ends with a dark twist as the alcoholic character finds himself reborn as a factory-farmed chicken, suffering terribly while knowing he deserves it for his lack of compassion in previous lives. The piece uses nested narratives and recursive structure to explore questions of morality, reciprocity, and whether ethics require self-interest as motivation. Shorter summary

Scott discusses how moral principles emerge from the relationship between emotional responses and rational consistency, using reactions to Gaza as a central example. Longer summary

Scott responds to three different arguments questioning the authenticity of moral principles and emotional responses, particularly around the Gaza conflict. He uses a personal story about his reaction to a tragic account from Gaza, contrasting his raw emotional response with the need for principled rational thinking. The post explains how genuine moral principles emerge from the interplay between emotional responses and rational consistency, arguing that while perfect consistency may be impossible, the effort to generalize our moral intuitions in a principled way is valuable and necessary. Shorter summary

Through various thought experiments around the drowning child scenario, Scott critiques common moral frameworks and proposes using Rawls' 'original position' to develop a more coherent system of moral obligations. Longer summary

Scott explores the limitations of distance and entanglement in Peter Singer's drowning child thought experiment through several creative variations. He examines two descriptive theories that explain our moral intuitions: the Copenhagen interpretation of ethics (gaining moral obligation by 'touching' a situation) and declining marginal utility of moral goods. However, he argues against using these as prescriptive theories, showing through thought experiments how they lead to absurd outcomes. Instead, he proposes using Rawls' 'original position' as a framework: imagining pre-incarnation intelligences making deals about earthly moral obligations. This leads to a system where everyone contributes to a general pot for helping others, with local emergency obligations distributed based on proximity and ability to help, not moral luck. Shorter summary

Scott argues that debates about prioritizing Americans over foreigners in the PEPFAR controversy miss the point, as cancelled foreign aid money wouldn't automatically fund effective domestic programs but would instead be spent much less efficiently. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques recent discussions about PEPFAR, a successful AIDS program in Africa that was briefly paused. He argues that debates about whether we should prioritize Americans over foreigners miss the key point: money saved from canceling highly effective programs like PEPFAR wouldn't automatically go to equally effective domestic programs. Instead, it would likely fund much less effective initiatives or get lost in general federal spending. The post explains how government spending tends to be inefficient, and argues that even if you value American lives more than foreign ones, the effectiveness gap between PEPFAR and likely alternative uses of the money is so large (around 100x) that you would need to value foreign lives at literally zero to justify canceling it. Shorter summary

Scott critiques self-proclaimed moral nihilists who claim to not care about strangers' suffering, by pointing out their passionate response to the British grooming gangs scandal reveals they actually do care. Longer summary

Scott points out that self-proclaimed 'based post-Christian vitalists' who claim to reject caring about suffering of strangers in far-off countries, suddenly become very passionate about the British grooming gangs scandal. He argues this reveals their true moral nature - that like everyone else, they do have basic moral impulses that include caring about suffering of strangers. The post examines different ways people try to reconcile their contradictory moral impulses, and argues that admitting to having moral concern for others is more honest than trying to maintain a facade of not caring. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines Greg Lukianoff's definition of cancel culture and explores its limitations through hypothetical scenarios, arguing for a more nuanced understanding to strengthen anti-cancel-culture coalitions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses Greg Lukianoff's definition of cancel culture and explores its limitations through a series of hypothetical scenarios. He argues that while Lukianoff's definition is a good start, it doesn't address many nuanced edge cases. The post presents various examples involving pedophilia, controversial research, and media reactions to offensive content. Scott emphasizes the need for a more robust definition to strengthen anti-cancel-culture coalitions and clarify what actions are acceptable or not. He concludes that while it's difficult to define cancel culture precisely, more work on these questions could help create stronger agreements among those opposing it. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that altruism and vitalism mostly align in practice, and that focusing on their theoretical divergences often stems from signaling rather than genuine pursuit of societal improvement. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to critiques of his understanding of the Nietzschean objection to altruism, particularly the idea that vitalism (maximizing life, glory, and strength) is superior. He argues that in most normal cases, altruism and vitalism suggest the same solutions, and their apparent divergence only occurs in extreme, unrealistic scenarios. Scott suggests that both philosophies, when taken to extremes, lead to absurd outcomes. He expresses suspicion towards those who focus too much on the divergence between altruism and vitalism in normal cases, arguing that such focus often stems from a desire to signal toughness rather than genuinely pursuing societal strength. The post concludes by challenging vitalists to 'pretend to really try' in implementing their philosophy, suggesting that this would likely lead to outcomes similar to those pursued by altruists. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander summarizes and responds to comments on his review of 'What We Owe The Future', addressing debates around population ethics, longtermism, and moral philosophy. Longer summary

This post highlights key comments on Scott Alexander's review of William MacAskill's book 'What We Owe The Future'. It covers various reactions and debates around topics like the repugnant conclusion in population ethics, longtermism, moral philosophy, AI risk, and the nature of happiness and suffering. Scott responds to several comments, clarifying his views on philosophy, moral reasoning, and the challenges of population ethics. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reviews Will MacAskill's 'What We Owe The Future', a book arguing for longtermism and considering our moral obligations to future generations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander reviews Will MacAskill's book 'What We Owe The Future', which argues for longtermism - the idea that we should prioritize helping future generations. The review covers the book's key arguments about moral obligations to future people, ways to affect the long-term future, and population ethics dilemmas. Scott expresses some skepticism about aspects of longtermism and population ethics, but acknowledges the book's thought-provoking ideas and practical suggestions for having positive long-term impact. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his post about criticism of EA, addressing various points about scientific paradigms, types of criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander responds to comments on his previous post about criticism of EA. He addresses various points raised by commenters, including discussions about the nature of paradigm shifts in science, the value of specific vs. general criticism, and the ethics of evangelism. Scott clarifies that he wasn't arguing EA only wants non-threatening criticism, but rather that some organizations genuinely want to improve. He also reflects on the challenges of distinguishing between expressing opinions and evangelizing, especially for philosophies that make unusual moral demands. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses reactions to his 'Justice Creep' article, exploring different perspectives on framing social issues as matters of justice. Longer summary

This post discusses various reactions to Scott's previous article on 'Justice Creep'. It covers three main categories of responses: those who support framing issues as justice matters, those who see it as a harmful trend, and a comment about 'sexual justice' for incels. Scott then explores the implications of these perspectives, particularly focusing on the distinction between care/harm and fairness foundations in moral reasoning. He also discusses animal welfare, environmental issues, and historical views on charity and justice. The post includes insights from commenters on topics such as the philosophy of justice, Google search result estimates, and the tension between identifying injustice and creating effective change. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the ethical considerations of insect farming for food, questioning whether insects have moral value and how this impacts our ethical decisions. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the moral implications of insect farming for food production. He explores the question of whether insects have moral value, citing scientific debates on insect pain perception and comparing the scale of insect farming to other forms of animal agriculture. The post touches on the environmental arguments for eating insects, the scale of wild insect suffering, and how considering insect welfare can influence our moral calibration. Scott uses a mix of scientific references, philosophical arguments, and humor to explore this complex ethical issue. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that eating beef is more ethical than chicken due to reduced animal suffering, despite higher environmental impact, and explores the complexities of this ethical calculus. Longer summary

Scott Alexander argues that eating beef is more ethical than eating chicken from an animal welfare perspective, despite beef's higher environmental impact. He calculates that switching from chicken to beef saves about 60 chickens per year at the cost of 2.2 tons extra CO2. Offsetting this carbon costs about $22 annually, which he argues is worthwhile given the reduction in animal suffering. He then explores the complexities of comparing direct action to offsetting, discussing potential market failures in offset pricing. Despite these complications, he concludes that eating beef over chicken is likely still the better ethical choice, especially if one is not actually performing the offsets. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the ethics of supporting formerly 'evil' companies that transition to more ethical practices, ultimately leaning towards supporting their new ventures. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the ethical dilemma of supporting formerly 'evil' companies that pivot to more ethical practices. He uses examples like Philip Morris moving to smoke-free cigarettes and KFC offering meatless options. The post discusses whether companies that profited from harmful practices should be allowed to profit again from ethical alternatives. Scott compares this to offering dictators comfortable retirements to encourage them to relinquish power. He ultimately leans towards supporting these companies' new ethical ventures, citing reasons such as the difficulty of predicting moral progress, the inconsistency of only boycotting visible offenders, and the practical challenges of effective boycotts. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander partially retracts his previous post on animal value and neural number after a commenter's larger survey yielded different results. Longer summary

Scott Alexander partially retracts his previous post about animal value and neural number. A commenter, Tibbar, replicated Scott's survey using Mechanical Turk and obtained different results with a larger sample size. Scott acknowledges that while Mechanical Turk users might not be the ideal sample and some responses seem rushed, it's difficult to claim his original results represent a universal intuitive understanding. He explains that his original sample was more informed about animal rights issues. Scott adds this to his Mistakes page and considers including a similar survey in the future, hoping readers will have forgotten about this retraction. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander finds a correlation between animals' cortical neuron count and people's intuitive perception of their moral value, based on a small survey. Longer summary

This post explores the correlation between the number of cortical neurons in animals and humans' intuitive perceptions of their moral value. Scott Alexander conducted a survey asking people to estimate how many of each animal would equal one human in moral value. He then compared these results to the relative number of cortical neurons each animal has compared to humans. The results showed a surprisingly close match, with some exceptions like lobsters. Scott suggests this adds credibility to intuitive ways of thinking about animal moral value, though he acknowledges the need for further research with a larger, more representative sample. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of people 'nominating themselves for the short end of a tradeoff' through their actions, and how this relates to ideas of desert and justice, sometimes conflicting with utilitarian calculations. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the concept of people 'nominating themselves for the short end of a tradeoff' through their actions, using three examples: an antidepressant with potential for abuse, a sexual harasser in a community, and basic income recipients who choose not to work. He explores how this concept relates to ideas of desert and justice, and how it sometimes conflicts with utilitarian calculations. The post grapples with the tension between utilitarian outcomes and the intuition that people who make bad choices should face the consequences, even if those consequences might be disproportionate to their actions. Scott considers various ways to reconcile or understand this tension, including viewing it as a misfiring heuristic, a revealed preference issue, or a necessary part of maintaining rule-based systems. Shorter summary

A fictional tale about choosing between cosmic principles when given ultimate power, ultimately satirizing decision paralysis and the concept of balance. Longer summary

This post is a fictional story about a person who finds an Artifact that grants mastery of the universe. The protagonist encounters a series of demon-like entities, each representing different philosophical concepts such as Order, Chaos, Balance, Excess, and various meta-levels of these ideas. Each entity tries to convince the protagonist to use the Artifact for their domain. The story becomes increasingly complex and absurd as more entities appear, presenting increasingly meta arguments about decision-making and balance. In the end, the protagonist, overwhelmed by the complexity, hastily chooses 'normal Balance' and destroys the Artifact. The story concludes with a reflection on the questionable wisdom of this choice and the protagonist's reluctance to spend more time on such an important decision. Shorter summary

Scott proposes that value differences arise from people crystallizing heuristics at different levels, rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible differences in values. Longer summary

Scott explores the idea that value differences stem from people operating at different levels of a conceptual ladder, from explicit models to emotional experiences to reified essences to endorsed values. He argues that this perspective can help people understand each other better, as differences often arise from where individuals choose to crystallize heuristics rather than from fundamental, incomprehensible value differences. The post discusses various examples of this process, from nutrition to punishment to environmental preservation, and examines factors that influence where people place themselves on this ladder, such as intelligence, education, and personal experience. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that fundamental value differences are less common and less aligned with political tribes than often assumed, emphasizing the need for coexistence despite varying values. Longer summary

Scott Alexander challenges the idea that fundamental value differences are a significant barrier to cooperation. He argues that many apparent value differences are actually factual disagreements or inconsistently applied principles. Using examples like foreign aid and immigration, he shows how people's values often shift based on context and convenience. Alexander suggests that while some fundamental value differences may exist, they don't necessarily align with political or cultural tribes. He concludes that since everyone has some value differences with everyone else, learning to coexist despite these differences is crucial. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines the concept of 'laziness' and value differences, exploring how semantic debates can obscure practical communication and understanding. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the concept of 'laziness' and debates about value differences. Through a dialogue between Sophisticus and Simplicio, he examines whether laziness exists, how to communicate about people with low motivation, and whether judgments about laziness are moral or practical. The post then extends to discuss punishment, evolutionary psychology, and the nature of value differences. It concludes with a metaphorical conversation about city centers, illustrating how semantic debates can obscure practical communication. Shorter summary

A dialogue critiques Michael Huemer's view on objective moral truths, arguing that moral changes are driven by wealth and societal conditions rather than convergence on objective truth. Longer summary

This post presents a dialogue between Achitophel and Berenice discussing Michael Huemer's view on objective moral truths. Berenice argues against Huemer's perspective, suggesting that changes in moral values are primarily driven by increasing wealth and changing societal conditions rather than a convergence on objective moral truth. She provides examples such as changes in fashion, the impact of disease prevalence on moral foundations, and the influence of economic factors on moral decisions. Achitophel initially defends Huemer's view but gradually concedes some points to Berenice's arguments. The dialogue concludes with a discussion on whether certain moral foundations, particularly Care/Harm, might be more fundamental than others. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander explores 'bicameral reasoning', comparing how we often weigh issues equally (like the US Senate) instead of proportionally to their importance (like the House), leading to potentially skewed decision-making. Longer summary

This post discusses the concept of 'bicameral reasoning', drawing parallels between the US House and Senate representation systems and how people make decisions or judgments. Scott Alexander argues that often we give equal weight to issues of vastly different importance, much like how the Senate gives equal representation to states regardless of population. He illustrates this with examples from political issues, animal welfare considerations, and environmental concerns. The post suggests that this 'Senate-like' thinking can lead to poor decision-making by equating minor issues with major ones. While acknowledging some potential benefits to this way of thinking in extreme cases, the author ultimately argues for a more proportional 'House-like' approach to evaluating issues based on their actual impact or importance. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes that academics blaming their own demographic for societal problems stems from a desire to justify helping others within their moral framework. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores the paradox of academics from privileged backgrounds attributing societal problems to their own demographic group. He proposes that this behavior might stem from a fundamental human goodness, combined with a common moral framework he calls 'Moral Therapeutic Deontology'. This framework struggles to justify helping others without obligation, leading people to create reasons why suffering is their fault to align with their moral system. Scott suggests that utilitarianism offers a more straightforward justification for helping others without needing to assign blame, and argues this approach might be more effective in motivating aid without the drawbacks of identity-based guilt. Shorter summary