Scott explores what constitutes a deontological bar (hard moral rule) by examining when consequentialist reasoning should be constrained, using debates within AI safety about working with AI companies versus pursuing regulation as his main examples. Longer summary

Scott examines the concept of deontological bars - hard moral rules that shouldn't be broken even for good consequences - and tries to develop a framework for determining what counts as such a rule. He starts with the classic example of not assassinating leaders, then explores various formulations like 'act as if your maxim would become a general law' and 'don't defect from functioning norms,' testing them against cases like military disarmament and spreading misinformation. The post is motivated by debates in AI safety between those working with AI companies and those pursuing pause/ban regulations, with each side suspecting the other might be violating deontological bars. Scott proposes that the rule might be 'don't do something which would be bad if universalized, unless the norm is non-functioning in such a way that you'd be playing cooperate while your enemy plays defect,' though he acknowledges this requires interpretive work and common sense to apply. Shorter summary

Scott argues that Trump supporters and conservative-aligned people who push back on bad administration policies should be supported rather than pressured to publicly denounce Trump, as they're often the only ones who can effectively prevent worse outcomes. Longer summary

Scott argues that Trump administration officials who maintain credibility with the administration while pushing back on bad policies are a valuable resource that should be supported rather than condemned. He explains how the Trump administration ignores liberal criticism but sometimes listens to loyal Republicans and Trump supporters, making these 'thoughtful collaborators' crucial for preventing worse outcomes. The post defends people who work within conservative institutions or refrain from publicly denouncing Trump while privately working to improve policy, arguing that demanding they explicitly condemn the administration would eliminate their effectiveness. Scott addresses concerns about collaboration legitimizing the administration by noting that voters are too uninformed and polarized for policy details to significantly affect political outcomes, making the real-world benefits of good policy more important than theoretical electoral effects. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reposts his 'Non-Libertarian FAQ' critiquing libertarian philosophy and arguments, noting it no longer fully reflects his current views. Longer summary

This post is a reposting of Scott Alexander's 'Non-Libertarian FAQ' (aka 'Why I Hate Your Freedom'), which he wrote about 5 years prior. The FAQ aims to provide a comprehensive critique of libertarian philosophy and arguments. It covers economic issues like externalities and market failures, social issues like social mobility and taxation, political issues like government competence and specific policy areas, and moral issues around rights and consequentialism. The author notes that this version no longer fully reflects his current views and is being reposted by popular request and for historical interest. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander proposes two strategies for meat-eaters to reduce animal suffering: eating beef instead of chicken and donating to animal charities as 'ethics offsets'. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses two strategies for reducing one's contribution to animal suffering while still eating meat. First, he suggests replacing chicken with beef, as this dramatically reduces the number of animals killed for food. Second, he proposes using 'ethics offsets' by donating to animal charities, which can potentially save more animal lives than personal vegetarianism. The post explores the ethical implications and potential criticisms of these approaches, including concerns about hypocrisy and the effectiveness of animal charities. Shorter summary

The post analyzes survey data to examine if effective altruism attracts people with mental disorders, finding slightly higher rates of autism but no evidence of unusual self-hate or scrupulosity. Longer summary

This post examines the theory that effective altruism (EA) attracts people with mental disorders. The author analyzes data from a Less Wrong survey, comparing rates of mental illness between EA and non-EA respondents. The findings show that EAs have similar levels of anxiety and OCD, slightly higher rates of depression, and significantly higher rates of autism compared to non-EAs. The post also discusses the relationship between consequentialism, gender, and EA, noting that EAs are much more consequentialist than non-EAs. The author concludes that while EAs may be slightly more autistic, they are not unusually self-hating or scrupulous compared to other rationalists, though both groups may differ from the general population in various ways. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander reevaluates Kant's philosophy of universalizability, applying it to modern ethical dilemmas and exploring its relationship with utilitarianism. Longer summary

Scott Alexander revisits Immanuel Kant's philosophy, particularly his concept of universalizability, and finds it more insightful than he previously thought. He reframes Kant's controversial axe murderer example to show how it relates to maintaining the possibility of positive-sum bargains. Scott then applies Kantian principles to modern ethical dilemmas, discussing the challenges in defining and universalizing maxims. He explores the relationship between universalizability and utilitarianism, suggesting that consequentialism might be prior to universalizability, which in turn could be prior to specific versions of utilitarianism. The post ends with an acknowledgment that while these ideas are complex and confusing, they represent a higher level of understanding about important ethical issues. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues for selling Detroit's museum art based on a cost-benefit analysis, emphasizing the value of quantitative thinking in decision-making. Longer summary

Scott Alexander discusses the debate over selling art from Detroit's museum to address the city's financial problems. He cites an analysis from Marginal Revolution that calculates the cost of keeping a specific painting, concluding it's about $1200 per viewer. Scott emphasizes the value of attempting to quantify such decisions, even with imperfect numbers, as it can make the answer obvious. He argues for a consequentialist approach and provocatively suggests selling all the art and replacing it with forgeries, noting that signaling cultural superiority in Detroit might be misplaced. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander discusses how the clarity experienced when awakening from meditation-induced delusions mirrors his appreciation for simplifying philosophical concepts. Longer summary

Scott Alexander describes his experiences with meditating while tired, which lead to increasingly complex and delusional thoughts. He then experiences a moment of awakening where he realizes the simplicity of the task. This feeling of clarity and simplification is compared to his passion for ideas like consequentialism, atheism, and capitalism, which provide similar moments of clarity in complex situations. While acknowledging that this feeling isn't an argument for these ideas, Scott expresses how fundamental this aesthetic is to his thinking. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander argues that claims about pro-lifers secretly wanting to oppress women are uncharitable and likely false, and that we should engage with actual philosophical disagreements on abortion. Longer summary

Scott Alexander critiques an article arguing that pro-lifers don't actually care about fetuses but only want to coerce women. He argues this claim is uncharitable and likely false for several reasons: 1) It misunderstands the non-consequentialist ethics of many pro-lifers, 2) There's no evidence of widespread secret motivations, 3) It's unclear what it would even mean to 'not really believe' something, 4) It commits the genetic fallacy. Scott argues we should engage with the actual philosophical disagreements rather than impugning motives, and that the principle of charity is important when discussing contentious issues like abortion. Shorter summary

Scott Alexander examines his doubts about utilitarianism and explores moral contractualism as a potential alternative for grounding morality. Longer summary

Scott Alexander explores his doubts about utilitarianism in this post. He discusses three main issues: the complexity of utilitarianism's superstructure, the problem of whose preferences to consider, and the lack of objectivity in consequentialism. He argues that utilitarianism often aligns with his moral intuitions, but when it doesn't, he tends to follow his intuitions instead. This leads him to consider a form of moral contractualism as an alternative. He proposes a system where people imagine and follow a hypothetical perfect contract that balances different moral views. This approach allows for some level of moral communion between groups with similar values, while acknowledging fundamental differences with others. Scott concludes that while this system doesn't solve all problems, it might be a step forward in grounding morality. Shorter summary